Where does the French-Moroccan consensus on Western Sahara leave Algeria?

By. Callum Nelson

DOI: 10.57912/28063361

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This October, France officially announced its support for Moroccan sovereignty over the heavily contested Western Sahara region, resulting in a diplomatic backlash from Algeria. Tensions were furthered when the European power announced it would invest over €10 billion into the area in the coming years. Algeria and Morocco, both former French colonies, have been competing to become the country’s primary partner in the Maghreb for almost 60 years.  While Algeria may temporarily withdraw from further Western cooperation, it has shown interest in strengthening partnerships with Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and its historically, Russia. Though France’s position has pushed Algeria to withdraw its ambassador, it is unwise to imagine that this decision represents a broader isolationist trend, as some pundits have suggested.

Following the Spanish withdrawal from Western Sahara in 1975, the former colony has been at war since the establishment of Moroccan de facto control in 1979. In 1991, the UN brokered a ceasefire between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) by creating the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The resulting rapprochement provided a transitional timeline during which the people of Western Sahara would decide between independence or integration with Morocco. Still, tensions between the two states remained high during this period. Despite economic support from Algeria, the SADR controls only ~30% of the territory today, with the remaining 70% occupied and administered by Morocco. In the last ten years, Morocco has won support from most of the Arab League, as well as recognition from the United States in exchange for a normalization of relations with Israel. By contrast, the SADR would go on to break a 29-year-old ceasefire treaty in 2020 in response to growing concerns about Morocco’s intentions. 

France’s decision comes following a UN Security Council vote in which 12 countries voted to extend the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in the former Spanish colony for another year. A notable development was the abstention from the Russian delegation. This frustrated the Algerian representative and left the nation further isolated from the international community. These events have left the African Union as the last major intergovernmental organization to recognize the Sahrawi Democratic Republic as a sovereign nation. Recent cooperation efforts between Morocco and Ethiopia, major players in the African Union, threaten even this relationship. 

The developments in the Western Sahara have had wide-ranging implications for African and global affairs. Following France’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, Rabat has shifted its strategy to strengthen relations with Ethiopia to convince the influential power to renounce its support of the SADR and sever diplomatic ties. In response, Algeria has attempted to make strategic partnerships with Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, inviting leaders from each North African country to attend military demonstrations in celebration of anti-colonialism, and calling attention to the new involvement from former colonial powers in the region, like France. These partnerships are made to constrain Moroccan dominance over the Maghreb. Globally, France’s decision has pushed Algeria to withdraw its ambassador from Paris and arrange for Algerian banks to stop the processing of French imports and exports. Further, Algeria has been pushed closer to its historical partner Russia, agreeing in early November to expand collaboration in mining and energy.  

For Algeria, this growing wariness of Western cooperation could signal further isolation from the West, coupled with a greater willingness to forge new partnerships with Russia and China. Additionally, Algeria may intensify efforts to counter Morocco’s rise as a regional authority, such as the propaganda campaign launched to stoke Egyptian fears over Morocco and Ethiopia’s growing relationship. 

Algeria, rich in hydrocarbons, has historically been a key supplier of natural resources to Europe. However, this role may change in the coming years as the North African country seeks to diversify foreign investments in its natural gas sector. Algeria has recently amended its hydrocarbon laws and reaffirmed its preparedness to facilitate foreign investment at all stages, perhaps in an attempt to attract the attention of China and further investment engagement from Russia. 

Rabat has not thus far released any official stance on the situation with Algeria; however, one could expect a tightening of relations with Europe and the United States in response to Algeria’s decidedly anti-Western movement. As Algeria has been a historic oil and gas supplier to Europe, an evolving partnership between Rabat and Moscow will likely impact energy supply to the region. While Algeria has further isolated itself diplomatically from Western influence in response to France’s decision in late October, this response is not necessarily representative of a broader isolationist trend. Algeria appears strategically aligned in numerous aspects to international cooperation, which should be considered when developing foreign policy goals.

The ongoing conflict in Western Sahara represents more than just the conclusion of a historical territorial struggle. As Algeria considers their diplomatic, military and resource allegiances with the international community, the United States and Europe stand to lose a powerful partner if they stand by while Russia continues to build a presence in North Africa. If the United States hopes to contest the growing Russian presence in North Africa, it must carefully consider how the French-Moroccan consensus on Western Sahara has influenced Algeria to pursue non-Western cooperation.