By Patrick Alexander
In the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union quietly began shipping nuclear weapons to Cuba. With Cuba being only 90 miles off of the coast of Florida, the American homeland was closer to the nuclear threat than ever before. As a nation watched with bated breath, President Kennedy managed a deescalation with his Russian counterpart that saw the missiles in Cuba return to the Soviet Union. Sixty years on, the event remains one of the times the Cold War came closest to turning hot. While we can look back on this event through the lens of history, it’s imperative for American security interests to ask: where could it happen again? And how could it be prevented?
Venezuela presents a possible candidate for such a military stand-off. Following Hugo Chavez’s death, Nicolas Maduro took charge of the country, resulting in a halving of the national GDP in his first six years in power, over three-fourths of citizens living in extreme poverty, and extreme rollbacks of citizens’ rights. Maduro’s autocratic dominance was violently challenged by opposition forces in 2019, led by Juan Guiadó; many of his supporters inside the nation have since been arrested, while the Venezuelan opposition has taken a backseat to many other causes on the international stage.
Venezuela holds many differences to Cuba. Crucially, it does not have historical precedent to fear an American invasion to justify military buildup, as Cuba did following the Bay of Pigs invasion. In this regard, the Cuban missile crisis analogy falls short. However, Venezuela does have a powerful state supporting it as Cuba did, one that could be more willing to challenge American influence in the region than the U.S.S.R. was: China.
China has been accruing influence in Venezuela since the signing of a “strategic development partnership” in 2001. This has constituted loans and direct investment in Venezuela, rendering China Venezuela’s largest creditor. As of 2019, that partnership has yielded 790 Chinese-supported projects in Venezuela. China has much to gain from Venezuela, particularly its oil reserves, the largest proven amount of any nation. China relies on its $150 billion of crude imports, the greatest dependence of any nation, which is why it has used Belt and Road funds to help repair Venezuelan oil refineries and built more of its own to handle Venezuelan crude oil. It is of note that China does not buy Venezuelan crude directly; rather, it has loaned over $67 billion to Venezuela since 2007, which has then been paid back through oil shipments.
This pattern of Chinese development parallels its broader Belt and Road Initiative strategy: infrastructure investing in resource-poor countries in order to turn a profit, extract natural resources, and gain a geopolitical foothold. Billions in aid and financing to the developing world have amounted to more support for China against allegations of Uighur genocide, increased Chinese cultural presence, and, most notably, an overseas naval base in Djibouti. This marks a significant increase in Chinese force projection on a critical trade chokepoint.
With a hostile superpower, a rogue state not far from the American homeland, and geopolitical tensions reaching a height, more signs point to a standoff similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis looming in the near future. But with or without a military buildup that could threaten the U.S., the Chinese-aligned Maduro regime stands in the way of what could be a very beneficial relationship. Accruing more influence with a free and democratic Venezuela comes with many benefits. The aforementioned oil reserves could provide a large and close supply for American markets, while the optics of reconciliation with the Bolivarian Republic could show that American liberal foreign policy still works after high-profile missteps. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a visible ally in a region where China is beating the U.S. in trade and direct investment. With all of these stakes, American foreign policy leaders must make accruing influence in Venezuela a top priority.
There are two schools of thought for the U.S. to accrue more influence in Venezuela: the cooperation route and the post-Maduro route. The cooperation route would entail the reduction of sanctions and bilateral work on issues that affect both nations. The State Department is already considering lifting oil sanctions in exchange for the Maduro regime resuming talks with Guiado’s opposition. This route would increase cooperation and lower domestic gas prices, but also give legitimacy to Maduro’s violent leadership. Alternatively, the post-Maduro route involves pressuring the Maduro regime to a point of weakness, at which point the democratic opposition, led by Juan Guiado, could rise to power. Policies that could accomplish this could include a revival of rhetoric condemning the Maduro administration, limiting exports to Venezuela, or increasing aid to civil society groups in Venezuela. A Guiado-led Venezuela would be more receptive to American interests, but further isolating the Maduro regime could lead it to more dependency on China.
While the prospect of a failed state so close to the border presents an imminent danger, cooperating with Maduro is the best and most unpopular path forward for now. Amidst the Ukrainian war, a tight energy market, and a distracted American foreign policy, encouraging a regime change in Venezuela is not in the American interest. In the years to come, when the energy market is more relaxed and American foreign policy can focus on countering China, then a post-Maduro Venezuela can be achieved through economic, diplomatic, and covert means. In the meantime, there is more to gain from increased oil imports, a pacified dictator, and competing with China as a financial suitor.
If a new Cold War is inevitable with China, then a new Cuban missile crisis might be too. It would be enabled by American passivity towards China, an isolationist desire to remain focused on domestic policy, and ignorance to the benefits of the current liberal world order. Venezuela is one of many states that will be caught up within this new Cold War, but its location and natural resources grant it special importance to the U.S. Heeding the lessons of the past and taking a more involved role in the country will save us from the same terror that seized the nation sixty years ago.
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