By. Narupat Rattanakit
The US-Japan Summit on April 10th garnered significant anticipation, symbolizing Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's inaugural state visit and echoing the historic precedent set by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Yet, the summit took on a new significance with the inclusion of the Philippines, adding a fresh dimension to the proceedings. Historically entangled with both the United States and Japan through colonization with the former and occupation with the latter, the Philippines' participation marked the inception of the first-ever trilateral summit among these nations.
This development underscores the importance of understanding why the Philippines is a focal point for Japan and what has strengthened Washington's security collaboration with Manila. Addressing the steps and challenges in formalizing the trilateral alliance is crucial for shaping future regional cooperation and security in the Indo-Pacific, especially with President Biden's reaffirmation with its allies in Asia.
The disputes in the West Philippine Sea, commonly known outside the Philippines as the South China Sea (SCS) between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are nothing new. These disputes primarily revolve around isles and shoals in the SCS, a strategically important and resource-rich waterway China claims almost entirely through its nine-dash line claim. The likelihood of an escalating incident that could trigger a conflict sooner or later in the Indo-Pacific is new and quite significant. What prompted this heightened tension is China’s ongoing gray zone tactics in the Second Thomas Shoal with the use of lasers, water cannons, acoustic devices, and direct ramming of Philippine resupply vessels.
In 2023, two collisions occurred between Chinese and Philippine ships on October 22, when Philippine vessels were attempting to re-supply a naval outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), there has been a substantial increase in the number of Chinese vessels present at Second Thomas Shoal during Philippine resupply missions. In 2021, an average of one Chinese ship was sighted at Second Thomas during such missions. By 2023, this figure had surged to around 14 ships. Over the past two years, China's coast guard and affiliated vessels have consistently harassed the re-supply vessels aiming to reach the Sierra Madre, which serves as Manila’s primary outpost in the Spratly Islands.
Since assuming office in June 2022, President Ferdinand (BongBong) Marcos Jr. has overseen a pivot in Philippine foreign policy, marked by closer alignment with the United States compared to his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. Duterte had pursued a policy of closer alignment with the PRC, driven by domestic factors and a desire to ease tensions in the SCS through a more conciliatory approach towards Beijing. However, despite initial hopes for improved relations under the Duterte administration, it did not lessen the PRC's assertive actions in the SCS.
Amidst discussions surrounding the SCS, numerous Philippine foreign policy analysts advocate for the nation's pursuit of a "middle power" status. Central to this aspiration is the bolstering of the military capabilities to effectively counter China's persistent encroachments in the region. Consequently, forging closer ties with a diverse array of countries has become imperative, extending beyond traditional alliances with Washington alon. This multifaceted approach is seen as essential for safeguarding Philippine interests in the face of regional challenges.
As Japan remains the most trusted major power in Southeast Asia, the United States is strategically leveraging this trust. Japan's increased defense collaboration, launched after the release of its National Security Strategy in December 2022, highlights its dedication to regional stability. Moreover, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida's address at the Congress of the Philippines emphasizes the dawn of a "golden age" in bilateral relations, characterized by an unprecedented alignment of strategic interests between the two nations.
Under the banner of "realism diplomacy," Kishida pledged a bold new era, vowing Japan's proactive engagement in addressing challenges both regional and global. His visit in the Philippines reaffirmed his dedication by promising over five hundred million dollars in funding for five new patrol boats for the Philippines Coast Guard. This shift signifies Japan's evolution from a mere "Spoke" within the US alliance network to a pivotal "Hub" in the regional landscape.
President Biden has consistently emphasized the unwavering strength of the US-Philippines relationship, often describing it as "ironclad" due to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). This treaty means that an attack on Filipino nationals will trigger a defense response, underscoring the strategic clarity in addressing the South China Sea (SCS) issue.
As President Marcos Jr. has no plans to give the US access to more Philippine military bases, the appointment of Kurt Campbell, as the new Deputy Secretary of State, has notably bolstered US efforts to keep close ties with its Filipino counterparts.
Questions arise about the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the SCS issue, especially given that the Philippines is one of its founding members. The slow progress of the Code of Conduct (COC), aimed at fostering peace in the SCS, has cast doubt on ASEAN's effectiveness due to its consensus-based, non-interfering decision-making approach. This has caused the Philippines to address the issue alone or with other maritime claimant states like Vietnam. Despite limited tangible actions within ASEAN, the 2023 summit hosted by Indonesia highlighted the SCS issue.
Claimant states in the SCS have failed to unite and confront China’s assertiveness, due to ASEAN’s approach to handling the dispute and Cambodia’s support for China. While minilateralism has not yet undermined regional stability, there is a call for increased involvement for the US and Japan in ASEAN-led platforms like the East Asia Summit (EAS).
The recent developments are a significant win for Washington's unified deterrence against China, but the challenge remains in institutionalizing the alliance, similar to the US-Japan-South Korea model, particularly for the United States and the Philippines.
Firstly, internal dynamics within the Philippines pose a significant challenge. Ongoing debates between pro-US and pro-China factions, exacerbated by fears of concessions made by the previous administration, have intensified. These internal tensions have not only gripped national attention but also dominated headlines, complicating the efforts to fortify the alliance and presenting a substantial hurdle to cohesive policy-making.
Secondly, Manila must prioritize engagement with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Given the South China Sea's status as a vital maritime corridor, maintaining strong regional ties is imperative. This responsibility extends to managing U.S. involvement in the area, ensuring that foreign influence aligns with regional stability. Consequently, fostering a unified regional response is crucial for the Philippines to navigate these complex dynamics effectively.
Lastly, given that US security and defense commitments are ironclad and clarified, the question arises regarding US restraint in Southeast Asia, particularly amidst escalating deterrence measures in the SCS. Prime Minister Kishida's apprehensions about the potential for conflict in the region echo concerns that the current tensions in Ukraine could foreshadow future challenges in Asia.
Balancing deterrence with regional stability will be essential, especially considering the reluctance of Southeast Asian nations to be drawn into conflict, despite their desire to hold China accountable for its actions in the SCS. The ongoing struggle in the SCS is a crucial test of the Philippines' leadership and will define the future of the trilateral alliance, potentially paving the way for its institutionalization.
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