By Cheryl Tull
On May 18, 2022, the countries of Sweden and Finland both applied to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, commonly known as NATO. This proposal had come as a response to Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine three months earlier. While it seems like this should have been a relatively straightforward affair, Turkey has blocked the entry of both on the grounds that they harbor anti-Turkish individuals and groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In addition, recent Islamophobic demonstrations in Stockholm, including one where a far-right politician in Sweden burned a Quran at a protest early in January, have led Erdogan to proclaim that he will never let Sweden into the alliance and caused Finland to consider pursuing a solo bid. Considering the fact that Erdogan is facing upcoming elections in June, this move may be a calculated one designed to foment rage domestically and keep himself popular amongst the people. All in all, Turkey’s political and economic troubles, its government’s double dealings with traditional Western enemies like Russia and Syria, and its complicated role as a geopolitical cornerstone in NATO beg the question: where does the Turkish-U.S. relationship go from here?
Turkey’s history in NATO began with Soviet aggression in the wake of World War II. Turkey’s geographic position controlling the Strait of Dardanelles and the Bosphorus threatened to block Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, which made the Soviets anxious about being denied strategic space. While at Yalta, Joseph Stalin remarked, "It is impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia's throat.” The first signs of trouble for Turkey came in March 1945, with the cancellation of the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression. Late in June of that same year a further note from the Soviets demanded bases on the straits, in addition to territorial adjustments in the Soviet-Turkish border as the price for renewing the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression. As a result of these hostilities, Turkey was pushed to look to the West for security guarantees. Despite some initial misgivings by American officials, the U.S. eventually recognized Turkey’s position in light of the rapidly emerging Cold War. Turkey was welcomed to NATO in February 1952 and hosts two key NATO air bases in Incirlik and Konya, with the former being home to 50 B61 nuclear bombs.
This history is important to discuss because, like so many bilateral relationships between the U.S. and other actors, this one was born out of mutual fear against a common enemy, and not born out of shared Western liberal values. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Turkey’s value as an ally was less certain than it had been previously. With the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2014, Turkey has further moved away from the democratic principles upon which NATO was built and embraced hardline authoritarian and Islamic rhetoric. This has been shown in the 2015 general elections where Erdogan’s party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), formed an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has expressed anti-Western, Eurosceptic views. Further proof is shown in the state of emergency Erdogan called for two years after the 2016 coup attempt. When the state of emergency ended in 2018, more than 107,000 people had been removed from public sector jobs by emergency decree and more than 50,000 people had been imprisoned pending trial. Many of those arrested were related to critics of Erdogan’s regime, whether they be politicians, journalists, or military officials. This broad purge of the opposition has allowed Erdogan to maintain a vise-like grip on Turkish politics, demonstrating further the gradual drift between the West and Turkey on ideological and political grounds.
On the military side, Erdogan has also purchased an advanced missile system from Russia, which NATO officials have called a threat to their integrated defense systems. Turkey also mounted a military incursion to battle the Kurds in northern Syria, an important U.S. ally at the time. Later in November 2022, Turkey launched Operation Claw Sword, which killed at least 10 people in two villages populated with internally displaced people. The airstrikes, which were cited as a retaliation for a bombing in Istanbul the week earlier that killed six and injured eighty, nevertheless drew sharp condemnation from many regional actors and the great powers. Overall, Erdogan’s actions at home and abroad not only threaten Turkish democracy but undermine U.S. strategic objectives at a time when cooperation among allies is needed more than ever. By placing short-term political objectives above anything else, Erdogan is eroding Turkey’s worth to the NATO alliance and threatening to force the U.S. into an uncomfortable position where it can no longer trust Turkey to be reliable on key issues.
The U.S. must take a harder line against Erdogan and his cronies in government. This kind of behavior would not be tolerated in any other NATO member state, and therefore it shouldn’t be allowed in Turkey. Even though Turkey possesses a unique geography that aids the U.S. in supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia, Turkey’s refusal to act in good faith or to abide by international norms has spoiled much of the potential cooperation that could be gained. In order to reset the Turkish-U.S. relationship, President Biden must not be afraid to make it clear to the Turkish government that the U.S. will not accept interference in American interests and objectives in the Middle East. The U.S. can accomplish this by reminding Erdogan that he is not the invincible leader he thinks he is. They can do this by taking charge of and solving problems Turkey has at home and abroad; in doing so, the U.S. sends a signal to Erdogan that he cannot continue to use these issues to boost his popularity at the expense of Turkish democracy or NATO strategic priorities.
One of the most pertinent examples is the recent earthquakes in southern Turkey. The quakes have killed at least 46,000 people combined but also laid bare the inefficiencies and ossified nature of the government as it has struggled to coordinate and respond to the resulting humanitarian crisis. There is anger at the government for its censoring of Twitter, arrests of people after the quakes for “provocative posts” related to the quakes, and zoning amnesties that allowed contractors to skip safety regulations and build houses quicker. The U.S. can take the lead on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, which will blunt Erdogan’s message that the West is an enemy of the Turkish people. The U.S. has already spent $85 million on Turkey and Syria and sent equipment and personnel to help with the search and recovery efforts. It can step this up by providing additional funds to help reconstruct the affected areas and ensure better building standards. While the U.S. cannot prosecute the people responsible for some of the most egregious building collapses, it can still advise companies by utilizing its own experience with earthquakes. By doing what the Turkish government has been unable to accomplish thus far, the U.S. can show Erdogan that he cannot flagrantly abuse their relationship as he wishes, that he remains dependent on Western support, and that Turkey’s value to NATO is not absolute.
Additionally, the U.S. can apply pressure on Turkey to accept Sweden and Finland by moving assets from its bases in Turkey to other countries. Moving too much would compromise the U.S.’s position against the Russians in the Southern Caucasus, but by making it clear to Erdogan that continued stubbornness may result in a shrinkage of U.S. forces, Biden can make it clear to Erdogan that he is not allowed to bend the will of NATO. It must also be acknowledged that Sweden has taken steps to earn Turkey’s approval. It lifted an arms embargo it had had on Turkey in September 2022 and banned an attempt to replicate the Quran burning two weeks ago. Turkey has every right to condemn this disgusting and hateful behavior by far-right extremists; however, it can also be pointed out that this incident presented a convenient opportunity for Erdogan to shore up support before the June elections. Within Turkish politics, it has allowed him to play on themes of nationality and Muslim solidarity at a time when the opposition has banded together to oust him from power. Regardless, when anti-Islamic sentiment is used to derail security enlargement, it poses a threat to all members of NATO. The U.S. can deal with this by issuing public stances of condemnation against the far-right actors who perpetrated these acts, while also making it clear that the Swedish government was not responsible or in support of such actions. By drawing that line of distinction, the U.S. could hopefully push Turkey and the two Nordic states back towards a meeting to hammer out the final negotiations before accession.
In conclusion, Turkey has an important role to play in U.S. interests and NATO as a whole. Its relationship with the U.S., while rocky and born out of circumstances that no longer necessarily apply to the modern day, is one that can’t be thrown away. Rather, Biden should apply firm pressure on Erdogan to halt his attempts to utilize foreign events to keep himself in power. By leaning on their security relationship and its commitment to democratic ideals, the U.S. can keep Erdogan contained to the point where the upcoming Turkish elections may allow for a fresh face who could be more cooperative and work with, rather than against, the U.S. and NATO. Until then, Biden cannot allow Erdogan to do what he wishes without consequence. That is not an ally, but an obstacle.
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