By Ryan Curtis
Syria’s Civil War
Syria is one of the last active battlefields in the Middle East, and a massive political unknown for the region. While the past few years of American policy seem to show a desire to fully withdraw from the Middle East, the US cannot afford to concede Syria to Assad and his Russo-Iranian allies. As the global power, the US must maintain a network of friendly, democratic, security-promoting states across the world, and increased American support to Rojava and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is essential for this.
Since the Arab Spring’s revolutionary fervor struck Syria in 2011, the country has been in a state of complex and violent civil war. Various factions have risen and fallen, but since the near complete containment of the Islamic State (IS) in 2018, the war has had three main factions. Assad and his Syrian Arab Army (SAA) represent the government, and with heavy Russian and Iranian support have wrested control of most of the country back into their hands. What remains of the Syrian opposition is a disparate alliance of rebel groups clinging onto their territory in the north and northwest of the country: primarily the Turkish-aligned Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Jihadist Tahir al-Sham (HTS). Lastly, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (Rojava) and their Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hold the northeast of the country, and many of the cities, border crossings, and oil fields in that region.
The Future of Syria and Rojava
Violence has largely receded from its highpoint in 2015, and most of the current conflict consists of irregular shelling and airstrikes between the opposition and Assadists, with Turkey and Russia playing their respective parts. Since the Turkish invasion of northeast Syria in 2019, Rojava and the SAA are nominally in a state of ceasefire, which has generally held despite occasional skirmishes. However, the peace between the two factions is a peace of convenience. Without American support, all Assad must do is bide his time, consolidate his rule, and then launch a counteroffensive to retake Rojava. This would achieve his long held goal of re-establishing control over the whole of Syria. This scenario is not unprecedented for Baathist leaders–with a very similar situation occurring in 1975 in Iraq. There, 5 years of ceasefire between the Kurds and Iraqi Government were used to allow for a buildup of Iraqi military and diplomatic strength, until the ceasefire between the two factions was thrown out in 1975 when Saddam’s strength eclipsed that of rebels. As long as the US leaves Rojava with an undermanned military detachment and no promise of protection, Rojava’s defeat is simply a question of when, not if.
Acknowledging that US support is critical to ensuring the existence and security of Rojava, it raises the question of how such protections for Rojava serve the interests of the United States. Why should the United States care if a tiny breakaway state in a war-torn country exists or not? The US should care because Rojava is a strong, reliable, ideologically agreeable ally and supporter for any Western security needs in the Middle East.
Need for an Ally
Ideological agreeability is an important attribute in an ally–while the US maintains strategic relationships with other Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia, they are not alliances in the same way that the US’s relationships with democracies are. Saudi Arabia does little to intentionally support American interests, and does not hesitate to directly oppose them when it’s beneficial. This was just seen recently; Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC began massive cuts to oil production, even while America and its allies in Europe face ever increasing energy costs. These production cuts increase the revenue that the Saudis gain from oil, at the direct expense of the US, to the direct benefit of themselves and America’s enemy, Russia.
Ideologically opposed strategic partners cannot be allies because they are not reliable. Existing American partners in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey even, all advance American interests solely when it benefits them. That by itself isn’t bad, but non-democratic partners are all far more willing to work with America’s enemies than its democratic partners are. Democratic countries are beholden to standards of human rights, international law, and free trade. And according to the Liberal school of thought, these shared democratic standards result in democracies' interests benefiting each other. That makes these countries true allies–they support American interventions, maintain equal trade relationships, and do not cooperate with America’s enemies.
In the Middle East a single country has a “free” ranking on Freedom House’s democracy index: Israel. This means that American Middle Eastern policy is reliant on strategic rather than ideological partners–countries who have shown their willingness to betray American interests. In such a critical region, this is a massive issue. An alliance with Rojava is the first step to remedying this shortage of democratic allies. Rojava is a successful democracy, and has demonstrated its excellence as an American ally in past operations against the IS. A renewal of this alliance would vastly strengthen the States’ position in the region.
Why the Middle East Matters
Whether the American voter likes it or not, a strong position in the Middle East is just as crucial now as it was 20 years ago. In the Middle East, three regional powers–Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran are involved in a cold war, while the global powers of the US, China, and Russia all support various sides in proxy conflicts. The Middle East is so contentious of a region for many reasons, but an essential one is that it lies at the intersection of Africa, Asia, and Europe. Any one power establishing a regional hegemony would give that power control over much of global shipping, global travel, and oil production. The region is host to the Suez Canal–an essential artery for global trade–, the world’s busiest international airport, and over 30% of the world’s oil production. Should this region’s strategic benefits be monopolized by a single power it would be very dangerous for American grand strategy. To ensure its own security the United States must prevent any power from taking control of the region.
Ensuring that Rojava remains an active state and ally is a needed step to guarantee that no one power consolidates in the region. As one of the few active battlefields in the Middle East, Syria is viewed as a pawn needed to control the whole region. This is why Iran has thrown its support so strongly behind Assad. Since the Revolution, Iran has been rapidly expanding its sphere of influence. Assadist victory in Syria would put an Iranian ally right in the middle of America’s primary partners–Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. While this fact alone is problematic enough, the fall of Rojava would also give Iran a secure land route to a port on the Mediterranean, and overall consolidate Iranian influence in the Middle East–making a secure ‘bloc’ of Iranian aligned countries.
What Rojava Does for the US
Assad’s number one ally is Iran, and Iran’s regional influence must be curtailed for several reasons. Iran is a threat to the American military, American allies, global peace and human rights, and the American people at home. Iran is responsible for backing countless Shia terrorist organizations, many of whom have excecuted campaigns of terror against civilians in Israel, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. Iranian backed organizations have also threatened US domestic security in the past; numerous Al-Qaeda operatives were found to have received weapons and training from Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 90s. This training likely aided in the execution of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and serves as an example for why Iranian influence and state-sponsored terrorism must be contained. Should the US let Assad’s forces recapture the whole of Syria, Iran’s position throughout the entire Middle East is strengthened, allowing them to begin focusing outwards–threatening civilians across the world.
While Iran plays a large role in promoting global terror, Sunni organizations like the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are perhaps greater threats to the US homeland, and must also be confronted. Terrorism thrives when it conquers territory. When a terror group can transition from a network of insurgents into an organization with the resources and strength of a state, it magnifies its power immensely. This was seen with the Islamic State’s rise and fall in Iraq and Syria–where the height of its territorial control was correlated to a massive increase in deaths at the hands of the IS. Of the three factions in Syria, both Assad and the opposition support terror organizations–the SDF on the other hand remains the primary force counteracting the IS in Syria, as well as a consistent enemy of the Al-Qaeda linked HTS. Rojava has established itself as an ally who is opposed to Islamist terrorism in all forms, and allowing the SAA or Turkey to destroy Rojava would only create a power vacuum for organizations like the IS to secure the territory they need to return to the world stage.
Turkey’s Role
Much of this piece has focused around the need to contain Jihadism and Iran–it is time to discuss Turkey. Turkey is a main actor in Syria, having launched three military operations into Syria against the SDF over the past decade. The President of Turkey–Erdogan–is opposed to the SDF’s mere existence, and he faultily equates them with Kurdish terror groups that operate in Turkey such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). There are undeniably vague connections between the PKK and SDF, but the two organizations are governed separately, and the PKK has not operated in Syria since the 90s. Erdogan uses operations in Syria and rhetoric against the Kurds as cheap political points among his nationalist supporters. In the complex mess that has been the Syrian Civil War, no faction’s hands are clean–neither the SDF or Turkey.
With that being said, Erdogan still maintains a very hostile opinion of Rojava, and any doubling down of American support would strain the US partnership with Ankara. While this is a factor to consider, Turkey is not in a position which allows them to break from the US.
In the Middle East, Turkey is a geopolitical rival of Iran and Russia. Turkey’s proxies in Syria are the main opponents of Assad and his Russo-Iranian partners, while the Turkish ally of Azerbaijan is the main opponent of the Russian partner of Armenia. Turkey desires to build a sphere of influence in the Middle East, and to do so they must oppose existing Iranian and Russian spheres.
This leaves Israel and Saudi Arabia as the remaining options for Middle Eastern strategic alignment, both of whom are also aligned with the United States, leading Turkey back to American alignment. Over the past few years Turkey has admittedly been deepening economic ties with China, but Turkey first and foremost needs military partners for its ambitions in the Middle East. Turkish-Chinese civilian trade may be high, but Turkish-American arms trade vastly outstrips any comparative Chinese trade.
When push comes to shove, Turkey needs the US as a partner, and the US can offer Turkey far more than any other potential partner can. There is a reason Turkey has remained in NATO, even after five years of America directly supporting and arming the SDF. Any US intervention in Rojava would be accompanied by grumbling and posturing from Ankara, but in the end Turkey will suck it up, just as they have before.
History’s Mistakes
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the premise of American intervention in the Middle East–especially in the name of democracy–puts a bad taste in peoples’ mouths. 62% of the country supported Biden’s withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and people on both sides of the political spectrum believe the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were “not worth fighting.” And they can’t be blamed; 20 years of failed interventions, pointless bloodshed, and active destabilization makes any US military intervention a careful balancing of interests and costs. However, increased support to Rojava offers the US a number of clear advantages while avoiding the pitfalls that previous interventions in the Middle East have fallen into.
The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan were largely failures because the US was unable to statebuild. Iraq’s attempt at democracy has fallen into corruption, tribalism, and political violence, while Afghanistan’s attempt at democracy was entirely crushed the second the US was unwilling to prop it up. The US military was given the task of building a Western style liberal democracy in countries with completely different history, culture, and economic status from every other Western democracy. Many of the people in Iraq and Afghanistan were opposed to the occupation because it was just that: an occupation. Given the impossible task of statebuilding for a populus that hated them, it's no wonder the US was unable to establish friendly regimes in Iraq or Afghanistan.
An intervention for Rojava would be completely different. Democracy in Rojava is an established institution, not an idealistic experiment. Rojava’s system has proven its efficacy in governing the country for the past 10 years, under one of the most progressive and protective constitutions in the world.
Intervention
The type of intervention that this piece is arguing for is a controlled, non-active one. Nobody wants another “forever war.” To ensure that this doesn’t happen, the intervention in Rojava should be first and foremost a diplomatic stance taken by the States: the US should release a statement that it will defend the territorial integrity of Rojava, and recognize its legitimacy on the world stage. The approach that should be taken is one similar to the intervention in Kosovo. With an American recognition of legitimacy, this alone will work to stave off state-based threats like future Turkish incursions, or conquest by the SAA. A similar thing was seen with how American recognition of Kosovo on the world stage has made any Serbian military operations impossible.
Assadist militias and non-state actors still remain a threat however. These can be deterred through an increased permanent military presence on the ground. As it stands an estimated 900 American troops are stationed in Syria, a small force compared to the 4000 NATO troops currently in Kosovo. To protect Rojava, the US detachment should be increased–at least to the 4000 that Kosovo receives.
This force should then also be backed with all of the logistics, training, intelligence, and combined arms power that other American interventions have carried. Air power specifically can be utilized as a tool to deter aggression while putting American forces in little direct danger.
Lastly, while the short-term goal of this operation is to simply ensure Rojava’s existence, the long-term goal is to develop a reliable ally in the Middle East. Thus, the intervention should come with significant amounts of military and humanitarian aid; all the tools to statebuild that the US has been more than willing to supply in its past interventions. The difference is that these statebuilding resources can be employed effectively, as the people of the region view the US as a friend, not an occupier.
As this intervention continues, Rojava will be able to direct its resources away from its desperate struggle for existence and towards developing a successful state, one with a legitimate military that can defend its own borders and aid in the execution of US operations in the region. Permanent military bases, air bases, and intelligence offices can all be based out of this well located new ally, allowing the US to divest military assets from its more unreliable strategic partners.
Conclusion
To put it plainly, Rojava is in need of a sponsor. Liberals and realists alike should be able to agree that the US, Rojava, and the West would all be better off if that sponsor is America. Rojava has proven itself an invaluable ally; one who values human rights, stands against terrorism, and considers themselves a friend of the West. There are few states in the Middle East who can say these three things about themselves, and the benefits of establishing a long-term ally in the region clearly justify the cost of military support.
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