By Cheryl Tull
Recent clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces two months ago have reopened a long-simmering conflict in the area. This border crisis, centered on the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, has since its origins in the 1990s claimed thousands of lives, destroyed critical infrastructure and industries in both countries and contributed to the ever present debate between self-determination and territorial sovereignty. Efforts have been made by Russia, the EU, the U.S., and other regional powers to affect a peaceful resolution, but as long as the fundamental problems of the conflict remain unresolved, bloodshed will only continue to be introduced again and again to the long-suffering people of both countries. To understand this crisis is to understand the legacy of post-Soviet borders, the power of ethnocentrism, and the destructive feedback cycle of proxy wars. The U.S. must take the lead in solving the crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan by utilizing both appeals to democratic ideals and pragmatic assessments of geography and resources to deliver both sides to the negotiating table.
The conflict is, in short, an ethnic crisis centered on the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is de jure within the borders of Azerbaijan but is predominantly inhabited by Armenians. The Armenians in the area wish to unify with Armenia, which has supported them based on nationality and self-determination, the latter of which it repeatedly presents to the international community as justification for its actions. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has been determined to crush this secessionist movement by any means necessary as a matter of territorial integrity, which has resulted in two wars and a never ending cycle of violence and terror for all. This issue didn’t start in the 1990s, but the disintegration of the Soviet Union during that decade most definitely provided fuel to the fire as it was no longer able to effectively temper the nationalistic impulses of both people. Indeed, the violence has so thoroughly hardened both sides that the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, has vowed to replace Nagorno-Karabakh with Azeris, while Armenia has launched several ballistic missile attacks on the Azerbaijani city of Ganja. This kind of behavior shows the length to which both sides are willing to go to fight for their people.
As a result, the history of diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting has been ongoing since the first war in 1994. That war ended with a Russian-backed ceasefire known as the Bishkek Protocol, and for most of the time since then Russia has been seen as the leader in the peace negotiations. Both countries have seemed to defer to Russian demands for peace, at least on paper. In fact, on October 31st Putin hosted the leaders of both countries to once again try and negotiate a settlement; this was conducted despite the vice-like grasp Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to have on his foreign policy. Russia has also supplemented its efforts with peacekeeping troops it has sent to the bordering areas between the two countries. The next biggest actor besides Russia is Turkey, which supports Azerbaijan with military aid and diplomatic legitimacy. This behavior is significant for two reasons: one, it questions the traditional idea that Russia would and should have suzerainty over its post-Soviet regions. And two, it shows that there are opportunities to be made to further limit Russia from exporting its brand of authoritarianism to fragile states in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This is where the U.S. comes in.
The U.S. must act where the Russians and Turks can’t or won’t. America’s gradual disengagement from the Middle East to focus on China, while commendable, ignores both the humanitarian necessity and strategic implications of being able to act as an effective peacemaker in a region that has had to acquiesce to Russian diktats for most of its existence. By taking the lead on negotiations, the U.S. could offer credibility to the possibility of finally resolving this issue. Of course, there are obstacles. Russia is not likely to yield its influence easily, especially at a time when the West and Russia are staring each other down.
In addition, President Aliyev is the head of a dictatorial regime, having led the country since 2003. The country’s elections since then have been characterized as fraudulent, while Aliyev’s relatives have enriched themselves in positions of power at the expense of the Azeri people. Armenia, on the other hand, also suffers from corruption and lack of a free press, but compared to Azerbaijan, it’s at least tried to make token efforts to improve its democracy. Despite this, the U.S. has provided more than $417 million in assistance to Azerbaijan since its independence in 1992. This isn’t just out of a humanitarian desire to see Azerbaijan prosper but also because of the country’s massive oil and natural gas resources. One estimate puts the total proven oil reserves as of 2016 at 7,000,000,000 barrels, with 843,546 barrels extracted every day. This accounts for 0.4% of the world’s total oil reserves, which, when combined with the 43.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas extracted by the country just in 2021 alone, shows its strategic and economic importance on the world stage.
However, this continued support for an autocratic regime that has no respect for the goal of U.S. foreign policy undermines any future attempts to reduce tensions. Azerbaijan will continue to believe it can get away with its behavior while Armenia will become more desperate and reliant on states like Russia, which could swiftly stomp out Armenian democracy. Like other actors that it works with, the U.S. must strike a balance between pragmatism and remaining true to the values that are supposed to guide its foreign policy: exporting the “American dream” and maintaining democratic values.
The U.S. must approach this crisis from a neutral standpoint. By prioritizing or appearing to prioritize one side over the other, it risks falling into the same trap as Russia where every action is scrutinized to look for any sign of bias. Expanding on this, the U.S. could tailor its approach to each side to bring them to the negotiating table. For Armenia, the U.S. could give aid to help stabilize its democracy and ensure that its people have faith in their governmental institutions to provide for their needs. They could also offer guarantees to help protect the movement of individuals between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh so that families can reunite with each other. For Azerbaijan, the U.S. could pressure Aliyev by threatening to cut its foreign aid or influence the amount of oil that makes it out of the Baku pipelines and into U.S. and European markets. Azerbaijan is a state built on oil money, so by hitting Aliyev’s bottom line, he would have a stronger reason to cooperate rather than just on the basis of human rights, something he clearly doesn’t respect. On the other hand, a positive way to bring Aliyev into the fold would be by offering investment to further develop and diversify the Azerbaijani economy. This, of course, would have to be contingent on Aliyev agreeing to abide by the rules of war and treating any currently held Armenian prisoners with the inherent respect and dignity accorded to them by international law.
These actions don’t have to conflict with Russia’s mission there already as long as the U.S. works with other allies to present a united front. France and the EU, for instance, have helped in the peace negotiations. By working with those allies, the U.S. not only strengthens the possibility of a peaceful resolution but also avoids being seen by Russia as “meddling” in its sphere of influence. Although it could be argued that it hardly matters what Russia thinks right now considering its animosity towards the U.S. for supporting Ukraine, blindly rushing in alone will not do the U.S. any favors. In addition, by coercing Turkey to support the peace negotiations, Azerbaijan would be deprived of one of its biggest partners and have a stronger incentive to cooperate instead of the current status quo where Russia accepts Turkish involvement as long as it doesn’t interfere too strongly with Russian objectives in the area.
In conclusion, the U.S. has an opportunity here that it mustn't squander. There is a common thread appearing more often lately that we have entered a new great-power era where the U.S. can no longer be the sole authority for all disputes. While the possibility of that can and is still being debated, nevertheless, the U.S. must still try to reinforce its mission abroad by helping wherever it can. Guiding Armenia and Azerbaijan to finally end something that has cost both so much might be a small win in terms of global foreign policy, but its outcome would say a lot about the U.S. around the world.
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