To achieve policy objectives, Russia has taken to the militarization of the Arctic. Its political implications in the modern global context demand a revised protocol for the United States and fellow Arctic nations.
By Maria Mager
Access to the Arctic Circle was revolutionized in 1957 when the first nuclear powered icebreaker, Lenin, emerged from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ice breaking vessels are not a radically new phenomena, but with the introduction of atomic energy and industrial power to the Soviet naval standard, the former USSR began the pursuit of expanding their sphere of influence into the Arctic Circle; an aspiration harkening back to the ambitions of Peter the Great. Nuclear icebreakers are industrial ships designed to clear ice in the Arctic circle to allow for convenient passage for commercial shipping and strategic positioning. Following 1991, the modern day Russian Federation inherited the Soviet icebreaker program, which was terminated in 1993 and restarted in 2007. By the end of 2027, the Russian Federation is scheduled to maintain a total of 10 functional icebreakers (not including non-nuclear), forging a path for the future of Russian involvement in the Arctic. In the contemporary world, new Russian action in the Arctic Circle carries irrefutable significance in global politics. The Russian Federation’s interests in the region are power driven in nature, and they have chosen to pursue their desires in a militarized manner reflective of Soviet nostalgia along with major investments in its Northern nuclear forces, endangering the regional security of Arctic nations. The American and foreign response in the Arctic has been insufficient in properly considering national interest in the scope of current geopolitical factors.
Background: Russian Policy In the Arctic Circle
Russian engagement in the Arctic concentrates on three major interests: fostering economic prosperity, protecting national security, and utilizing the Arctic as a space to reassert its prestige and status as a great power (as outlined in the 2008 doctrine, “The Foundations of the Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic Zone to 2020 and Beyond”). On the economic front, Russia relies on the Arctic and Subarctic regions for the majority of its oil, gas, and mineral extraction. As 11% of the country’s gross domestic product and 22% of its exports depend on Arctic engagement, it’s rational for the Russian government to assert a formidable presence to ensure its economic prosperity and prevent any chances of subordination to other Arctic powers. This presence in the name of economics can partially be attributed to climate change in cooperation with ice breaking efforts further opening the developing Arctic Silk Road.
From a security standpoint, Russia wants to reassert its territorial sovereignty along the borders of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). Here, it is endeavoring to secure transport routes and prepare for potential threats to sovereignty that could theoretically emerge in places such as the high seas. Russia’s security interest includes protecting the military infrastructure in the Kola Peninsula. The peninsula is the location of significant air and maritime bases, and contains notable second strike nuclear assets. To achieve a secure perimeter around the peninsula, Russia has been utilizing the “Bastion Defense Concept.” The Bastion Defense consists of a layered defense, with overlapping military capabilities from a range of different weapon systems covering all domains, which vastly improves the resilience of their defense network. Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been increasing militarization in the AZRF, claiming it’s for the purposes of preventing encroachment in the North; a peculiar claim considering that the Arctic Circle is jointly owned. Russia wants to avoid an encirclement (i.e. does not want its own possible courses of action to be restricted; they are concerned that the U.S. and allies will begin to increase their presence in the region as the ice shelves continue to melt, which may inhibit the pursuit of Russian economic and defensive positionings), and strives for a relationship on an equal par with the U.S. The Arctic is therefore a vital element in Moscow’s overall strategy.
Militarization in the Arctic: How Russia has been Achieving Their National Interests
To achieve policy, Russia has taken to militarizing the Arctic. This has materialized into a strategy that revitalizes and modernizes Soviet infrastructure (such as landing strips, radar facilities, protocols, and bases) paired with major investments in its Northern nuclear forces. Nostalgically, Russia resumed long distance flights of bombers along the the Russian and European Arctic in 2007, and revived Russian nuclear submarine patrols in 2008 (a practice which had guaranteed Russia’s nuclear second-strike capacity during the Cold War). The key to this resurgence effort is the Northern Fleet. Its primary objective is nuclear deterrence and defense along the Northern Sea Route, and also for protecting Russia’s resources and economic interests. The Northern Fleet’s nuclear component is the strategic submarines that are equipped with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which guarantee about two-thirds of Russia’s maritime nuclear second-strike capability. Further, it is within the Northern Fleet’s sphere of responsibility to manage Poseidon: a nuclear powered underwater drone, dubbed Putin’s “Doomsday Weapon” in 2018. This revitalization of previous Arctic ambitions plays a part in Russia’s desire for unrestricted access throughout the Arctic Circle; Russia aspires to make the 6,000 kilometer Northern Sea Route (NSR) an international shipping route while still designating it as a part of Russia’s national waters. Thus, to pursue economic prosperity, national security and prestige, Russia has chosen to increase and maintain a notable military presence. It can be assumed that the intended purpose is to intimidate and influence, consequentially discouraging Arctic competition and expanding Russian regional influence.
Russia’s Rationale: Perceived Threats
Russia’s stance and policy implementations in the Arctic depict a purely realist paradigm in international relations, implying that Russia’s militarized approach was a result of recognized insecurity and the desire for the alleviation of said insecurity. Putin, at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, cited NATO’s eastward expansion as a justification for increased action in the Arctic, and had also declared that Russia was back as a great power. The Russian government rationalized its modernisation of the armed forces stationed in the Arctic, its expansion of the military infrastructure, and its reactivation of Cold War bases by claiming these were necessary steps to protect its national interest, including its access to fossil resources. Moreover, due to climate change and advances in military technology, Russian territory is losing its natural ice barriers that limit foreign interaction, and feel as though that they are being pushed to assert dominance in the region due to a high concentration of Arctic states being NATO members (thus amplifying sensations of insecurity). Further, Russia’s own expansionist tendencies, such as the invasion of Georgia (2008), the illegal annexation of Crimea (2014), and the full scale invasion of Ukraine (2022) has further created agitation in the international community. This agitation has led to escalation: NATO itself is responding to the Russian invasion by assisting in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid to Ukraine, while many member states are acting independently. They are sending weapons, financial aid, ammunition and many types of light and heavy military equipment, including anti-tank and air defense systems, howitzers and drones to support the blossoming democracy. Further, NATO has taken to sanctioning the Russian Federation in an attempt to damage the Russian economy, thus hindering the pursuit of Russian interest. In its totality, escalation provides more of an incentive for the Russian Federation to aim for supremacy in the North, creating and magnifying a circular security dilemma: a situation in which “actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security.” With each measure taken out of defense, tensions only rise as states choose to interpret each action as a threat.
Current American Action
Russia recognized the significance of climate change in the Arctic Circle quickly. Noting that the melting ice caps could be detrimental to their global influence and national interests, Russia took the initiative to rapidly develop military operations and defense procedures, benefiting their placement within the international system by offering them leverage in the North. Understandably, Russia’s emphasis on Arctic activities has attracted American attention. Thus far, the United States has denounced Russia’s aggressive military expansion in the Arctic, and the Pentagon has its own plans to increase its presence and capabilities in the region. It is prioritizing the rehabilitation of cold-weather skills neglected while national interest favored preparedness for counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East. Aside from these developments in infrastructure, the Air Force has transferred dozens of F-35 fighter jets to Alaska, announcing that the state will host “more advanced fighters than any other location in the world.”
The Army last year released its first strategic plan for “Regaining Arctic Dominance,” as well. Although this declaration heavily refers to “cold weather adaptation equipment,” it does briefly mention nuclear interests. The Defense department aspires to train and equip forces appropriately based on assessments that interpret “material and personnel survivability within an operational nuclear environment. These assessments must assume that great power competitors not only possess but are willing to employ nuclear weapons to achieve tactical and strategic goals.” Further, U.S. strategic bomber aircraft have been carrying out regular flights over the Barents Sea, and in 2020, U.S. Navy and British Royal Navy surface vessels conducted operations in the area for the first time since the 1980s; these operations are continuing into 2022 under the name Arctic Thunder 22. Ultimately, Russian aggression has been met with American aggression. Although the situation is continuously changing, the U.S. is not equal with the Russian Federation. According to a Foreign Policy article, Russia has constructed over 400 military strongholds since 2014 and has revamped military exercises (most recently in January of 2022). America’s northernmost base is in Greenland, and has about 22,000 active military personnel in Alaska, an evidently less remarkable force.
The Insufficiency of Current American Action
The U.S. has 4 pillars of policy in the Arctic. These pillars are as follows: “security, climate change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development, and international cooperation and governance.” There is little evidence that there have been operations implementing these pillars (except for a slight increase of previously mentioned military action) since the recent increase of Russian military presence.
These pillars have been contradicted as the implications of increased Russian involvement in the Arctic due to its improper contextualization into global politics. The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has significant implications for the future of the Arctic. To contextualize this situation, the Arctic Council must first come into scrutiny. The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. Territorial claims are not recognised, disputed or established by the formulation of the Council, and nuclear explosions and radioactive waste disposal are prohibited. Concerningly, Russia chairs the Arctic Council this year. Due to the War in Ukraine, the seven other Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S.) have resolved to “temporarily pause” participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. The rationale for this action was that the core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, based on international law, have long underpinned the work of the Arctic Council.
With its explicit violation of international norms, Russia has damaged the prospects of international cooperation in the Arctic. This declaration has the potential to be devastating. In the absence of action by the Arctic Council during this time of international crisis, there is less of an incentive for Russia to hold back its desires for territorial and economic expansion. It is possible for them to take this lack of obligation as an opportunity to establish dominance over the Northern Sea Route and assert their power in this region in general. Abandoning this international institution at a time where the chairing nation openly violates international charters and norms poses an obvious security threat. Problematically, In the absence of the Arctic Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) claims that it “has a clear interest in preserving security, stability and co-operation in the High North,” and that NATO is stepping up in the Arctic as “Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine shows that we cannot take our security for granted – anywhere.” NATO’s most noteworthy Arctic policy is the regularly conducted anti-submarine exercises. Regardless of the fact that Putin outlined NATO expansion as one of Russia’s greatest influences in its aggressive foreign affairs, NATO increasing its involvement in the Arctic is contributing to a growing security dilemma, and is in fact not serving as a deterrent to further Russian militarization (as observed from the continuous revitalization of Russian nuclear projects).
Referring back to the Army’s recent publication, “Regaining Arctic Dominance,” the plan for the U.S. is largely defensive. As it does not consider other methods of approach to the situation; the United States is depending on deterrence. Even this is inefficient; unlike Cold War deterrence and proxy wars, Russia is making moves of territorial conquest (i.e. Ukrainian annexations) and has given numerous threats of nuclear strikes if Russian territory or states under Russia’s nuclear umbrella are harmed. Amping up tensions will only make the consequences of human error more critical during an hour of extreme hostility.
Still in the process of contextualizing the significance of Arctic Circle endeavors, a Ukrainian conflict spillover into the Arctic would put the U.S. military at a disadvantage anyway. A “spillover,” might entail a transfer of expansionist sentiments from Eastern Europe to the Arctic Circle. Vladimir Putin made several excuses for his invasion of Ukraine, such as self-preservation in spite of NATO’s eastward expansion into former Soviet Bloc countries (his sphere of influence), the peacekeeping efforts aiming for the "demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine,” and to “bring to court those who committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation." These statements, as well as the claim that Russians and Ukrainians were one people, a single whole on ancient Russian soil, and that Ukraine and Crimea are the results of a political mistake made by Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschchev, show that Putin acted upon a historical bias. If Putin invaded Ukraine based on an assumed historical right to do so, it’s not unrealistic to believe that he may refer to Peter the Great’s vision, or even to former Soviet ambitions in the region. Although the Russian military has been bogged down in Ukraine, Russia’s robust presence in the Arctic threatens American economic and political interests. American policymakers have been slow to recognize this challenge, leaving the country vulnerable to being out maneuvered in the rapidly shifting Arctic. The U.S. has commissioned one icebreaker, named The Polar Sentinel, which is to be delivered by 2025. This lack of icebreakers, the absence of nuclear-powered vessels, and reliance on allied icebreaker posturing in the region is a major flaw in the US national security strategy and defensive umbrella. Without strategic positioning or the capability to generate strategic positioning on its own, the United States has little influence over the future of Arctic procedures.
Policy Options: Securing the 4 Pillars
A simple step towards improving Arctic security and fostering sustainable economic development would be to increase the American icebreaker count. A stronger, non-militarized presence would offer the United States a better chance to protect its previously mentioned national interests. With the better positioning and presence initiated by the icebreaker increase, Russia would feel less secure in its pursuit to encroach Northwards. Nevertheless, this path comes with possible consequences to consider. Russians could perceive this course of action as an escalation, and thus a threat to Russian enterprise; this could provide Russia with further encouragement to push boundaries (literally). Increasing icebreaker presence could also undermine environmental protection, which consequently violates the charter of the Arctic Council. However, these reactions are less likely to occur if the United States limits the increase to solely non militarized efforts.
Another critical component to answering the Arctic question is fully comprehending the significance of international interactions in the current context of global politics. Ensuring norms of international waters via multilateral agreement amongst the Arctic nations is vital to achieving peace in the Arctic. Cutting participation in international accords decreases the extent of which Russia is held accountable; the member states of the Arctic Council must resume their activities to encourage accord in the region. However, as shown by Russia’s violation of international charters, partnership in international institutions are subjective and adherence to their prescriptions is not guaranteed. Thus, the strength of an agreement with Russia is questionable, especially as Russian nuclear threats continue to be omnipresent when discussing a cooperational foreign policy that focuses on action. These tendencies of the Russian state must be counteracted by unified action, not silence from the other Arctic nations.
As previously mentioned, the Russian predicament in the Arctic and the question of territorial integrity are inherently intertwined. The security dilemma between the West and Russia needs to be eased, and the Arctic presents an optimal place for this to begin. This could be done by dissuading NATO involvement in the Arctic. With the lessening of NATO presence, Arctic nations can take control of their own affairs. The U.S. in particular should look to its Northern allies for guidance in this theater. For example, Norway has begun to pursue a policy centered on maintaining a balance between deterrence and reassurance. They have elected to increase military operations in the Arctic in spite of Russia, as they observe the country’s growing military capabilities, its readiness to deploy armed forces, and its more active, aggressive, and unpredictable manner in foreign and security policy. They acknowledge that the Arctic has become an arena for great power rivalry and growing instability. Along with Norway’s increased military action, they have elected to demonstrate complete transparency about their procedures. By showcasing their militarized movements, Norway is exhibiting their strength in the region, while their openness offers reassurance (as obscurity about their intentions or capabilities is mitigated). The U.S. and other Arctic nations should follow this precedent and increase engagement with transparency to reduce tensions. A reduction in tension could open a pathway to increased cooperation and negotiation that allow all Arctic parties to resolve disputes peacefully and productively.
Russia’s aggressive policy in the Arctic must be contextualized in terms of both current global politics as well as history in order to approach the situation appropriately. To prevent Russian encroachment, America’s best option is to increase general presence in the region, reevaluate the significance of international institutions, and to ease the overall regional security dilemma. Pursuing this path encourages diplomacy, forging a world in which expansionism and dependence on nuclear deterrence are relegated to history books.
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