By. Miriam R. Dalum
DOI: 10.57912/28063109
Russia seeks to reclaim the influence it had in the Soviet era, with the exertion of control over its former Soviet states as a central foreign policy goal. Moscow’s methods can be varied, but they are always troubling. The most pertinent example is the war in Ukraine, but Russia is choosing an additional path to power through the Caucasus mountains. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been crucial for Moscow's sphere of influence. Despite Western sanctions, Azerbaijan provides a necessary north-south corridor for Russian trade into Europe. Furthermore, Russia has succeeded in pressuring Armenia into political obedience as it relies on Russia for defensive and economic security. Armenia and Azerbaijan have had a bloody relationship, most recently fighting two wars over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 1988 and 2020. With these conflicts, Russia took an unexpected approach for the authoritarian and historically aggressive nation and became a mediator. Russia found a new method of strategic dominance in both conflicts. Russia’s insistence on the control of its neighbors complicates its position as a mediator and makes a peaceful solution difficult.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is not new. The region, which is home to many ethnic Armenians, has been fought over by the two for nearly a century, with tensions only increasing since the fall of the Soviet Union. From 1988 to 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought their first Karabakh War. Russia brokered the ceasefire, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh having partial autonomy yet still heavily reliant on Armenia. Baku, being unsatisfied with this reality, caused tensions to rise with continuous drone strikes and special military operations that led to further clashes. The second Karabakh War officially broke out in September of 2020. The war saw aggressive cross-border fighting with heavy weaponry provided by Turkey and Russia. Once again, Moscow brokered the deal to end the war in November of 2020, leaving Azerbaijan in control of a large portion of the land it lost.
Russia appears to be an effective mediator as it brokered seemingly successful peace in both conflicts. However, Russia holds potent biases in the role. While the nation exerted its mediating capabilities, it also dealt arms with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia dealt arms to Azerbaijan at market prices. As Yerevan holds stronger ties to Russia, Armenia received the same but at a significantly lower cost. Armenia is also part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance with Russia. Armenia needs Moscow’s protection, and Russia enjoys pursuing it. Due to Russia’s profitable weapons deals paired with Armenia's vulnerability, Russia benefited from the Nagorno-Karabakh Wars. Because Russia wanted to not only exert power over, but also profit from the regional conflict, it is evident that it did not stop any escalation. Russia's lack of dedication to its peacekeeping efforts after 1994 contributed to the start of the war in 2020. As war is generally unpopular, Russia chose to dominate the region instead by ending the conflicts on its terms. Moscow takes on the role of mediating in bad faith, only caring about its control of the region.
Russia brokered forcefully and without interference. Despite methods in place for cooperation, nations such as France and the U.S. happily allowed Russia to take the lead in Caucasus-based peace negotiations. Since 1992 the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) has been attempting to conference with the warring nations. In 1994, the OSCE expanded upon its goal and created the Minsk Group. The group strives to create conditions where the two countries can meet and reach a peace agreement. The group is co-chaired by the Russian Federation, France, and the U.S., but only Russia has successfully made significant efforts to calm the region. Russia’s heavy hand dominates all peace talks, scares off other actors, and is untrustworthy in its motivations.
Unlike the Russo-Georgian War, there was little EU intervention in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moscow has been mediating alone, lacking other important moderating actors such as the United Nations. With no international influence, Russia is setting the stage to demonstrate and qualify its desires for illiberal approaches to peace. Russia uses humanitarian, political, and most importantly, military threats to forcefully keep the peace. Specifically, the danger to Armenia that a conflict with Azerbaijan may start again keeps the nation amenable to Moscow’s methods. The approach of mediating strengthens Russia’s control while also serving to separate Russia from its aggressive imperialist past. To bolster its influence and divert Western influence, Moscow wants to prove that it can make peace rather than cause conflict. These efforts are failing with the conflict in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Caucasus.
Russia’s untrustworthy motivations limit its mediating abilities. As it tries to cease the tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it also finds itself at war in Ukraine. Russia’s war against Kyiv has dramatically reduced its ability to mediate in the Caucasus, causing severe consequences. Russia had deployed over 2,000 peacekeeping troops because Armenia and Azerbaijan remained hostile after the 2020 war. Now, the peacekeepers are weakened, and fighting continues. The war in Ukraine led Moscow to remove its peacekeeping forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region early, before the agreed-upon 2025. Without Russia’s peacekeepers, Azerbaijan has been able to use harsh force and retake nearly all of the land it had lost. With Azerbaijan's continuing force unnerving Armenia, Russia's forces, which were a necessary shield, have now fallen. The act of pulling troops out demonstrates that Russia is not reliable. Moscow has spread itself too thin, trying to keep post-Soviet states in its sphere. Not only is the war in Ukraine representative of Russia’s harsh attempts at control, but its focus on domination is problematic for Moscow’s other responsibilities. Russia only undertook the role of mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh to control, and now it is failing. To allow it to continue will only destabilize the region further.
With Russia overextended, Armenia doubts Moscow’s commitments to its security. Russia confirmed it is pullingpeacekeepers out, but this leaves the region dangerously without other actors. Azerbaijan has an advantage over Armenia because of its previous victory. Also threatening is Azerbaijan’s friendly relationship with Turkey, a significant threat to both Armenia and Russia. When the Caucasus nations make peace without Russian involvement, as they have, Armenia tends to lose much of its territory to Baku. These uneven deals can only cause more tension. With all indicators pointing to more conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia being spread thin, other actors are desperately needed.
The region is in short supply of third-party mediators; the best solution is assistance from the European Union (EU). Although there are reservations about Europe meddling in Russia’s backyard, the EU is the only other entity that has brought leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia together since 2020. Brussels provides a physical space for peace talks and a chance at further Western assistance. In the wake of the war in Ukraine, The European Union wants to weaken Russia as much as it can and remain in touch with the Caucasus.
Furthermore, the EU can provide Azerbaijan and Armenia financial support for their peace efforts. The EU can work with the ethnic Armenians technically located in Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and prevent their isolation. It is essential, however, that Europe does not take complete control of the mediating effort and begin to undermine Russia. Ukraine was slipping out of Russia’s sphere of influence, hence Russia’s invasion. The same cannot be risked in the Caucasus. Therefore, while the EU mediating is necessary, it must support the Minsk Group first. The OCSE process will continue to allow Russia to lead the mediation and prevent an outrage against Western influence. The EU will support Minsk Group peacekeeping, as France and the U.S. co-chairs are partnered with a hostile Russia. Thus, the best solution appears to be to strengthen the existing methods of the OSCE Minsk Group with the support of the EU.
Both the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan show no interest in stopping their pursuit of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The conflict, even with a ceasefire technically in place, continues to escalate, with each country gaining more means of waging war. A mediator with motivations beyond influence is needed in the region, but Russia cannot be cut out completely. While Moscow has temporarily stopped the two Karabakh wars, it has failed to de-escalate conflicts in the region. Even more concerning is the fact that the Kremlin has spread itself too thin with its war in Ukraine. This is taking a toll on the stability of the Caucasus. To guarantee regional security, the EU must facilitate better mediation without provoking Russia. The Kremlin has the capability to insert itself into Armenia, and there is a possibility that Yerevan's disagreements with Russia will cause conflict. There is room for the EU to assist the Minsk Group in the Caucasus, but the EU must be cautious. Russia desires to be an alternative to Western peace initiatives, but its past aggression and newer focus on influence only make it an untrustworthy actor. Russia cannot be a reliable mediator when its focus is expanding its sphere.