By Christopher Trzaska
On February 20, 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden made a historic visit to Kyiv, Ukraine, as he marked the one-year anniversary of Russia’s brutal invasion. Undeterred by the blaring air raid sirens that have become a fixture of life in Ukraine’s capital, he met with Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy and underscored that under his administration, American support for Kyiv “will not waver”. However, such a promise might be more easily said than kept, as the war moves into a new phase and domestic political appetite for large-scale Ukrainian assistance begins to waver. With another major Russian offensive underway, American stocks beginning to run low, and a new partisan makeup of the U.S. Congress, it may be time to re-evaluate how the United States can best support Ukraine’s drive to preserve its independence.
Thus far, the U.S. has provided Ukraine with USD 77 billion in total aid. American support has been crucial to Ukraine’s battlefield success and without it, Ukraine would have been unable to accomplish what it has over the past year. American Javelin and Stinger missiles proved decisive in the opening stages of the conflict, allowing Ukrainian forces to defeat Russian armor columns and helicopter-borne assaults. As Russian supply losses mounted and Ukrainian forces regrouped for a counterattack, American equipment was crucial once more. Long-range rocket artillery, precise targeting information, and a steady stream of ammunition provided by the U.S. sustained Ukrainian forces as they regained wide swathes of Russian-held territory in the eastern part of the country, culminating in the spectacular liberation of the strategically vital city of Kherson in November of 2022.
As a renewed Russian offensive ramps up, Ukraine has requested more powerful and sophisticated weaponry like F-16 fighter jets and ATACMS missiles. The U.S. has declined these requests, with the Department of Defense noting that the ATACMS has been out of production for several years and American stocks of the munition are limited. In addition to logistical concerns, there are also wider strategic considerations as to whether America’s limited ATACMS stocks should be reserved for Taiwan, where they will be of crucial utility in any invasion scenario. ATACMS represents the only missile in the U.S. inventory capable of striking the Chinese mainland from Taiwan. While ATACMS would grant Ukraine the ability to target Russian supply lines and depots at greater ranges, including hard targets in occupied Crimea, such a capability would not be enough to break the current stalemate. Considering the missile is no longer being produced and the U.S. has already committed to delivering 64 of the weapons to Taiwan, Ukraine would have to be extraordinarily selective about how and when it deploys the weapon, limiting its operational effectiveness. The U.S. is in a difficult spot of trying to coordinate the defense of two geographically different countries from two very different kinds of military threats. It should reserve its limited ATACMS inventory for Taiwan, where it will be of more decisive utility.
The U.S. has also considered sending Ukraine F-16 fighter jets, a move that F-16 advocates say would significantly bolster Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian air attacks. However, the U.S. should be careful about providing such advanced weaponry at a time when its own air force suffers from critical deficiencies. Any F-16s sent to Ukraine will require technological refits to strip them of sensitive technology that the U.S. is unwilling to risk falling into Russian hands should one of the jets crash or be shot down. Additionally, Ukrainian pilots will have to be trained to fly the new jets, which are significantly different from the MiGs and Sukhoi platforms they are used to flying. Ukraine has noted that it will likely take at least 6 months to train the first squadron of F-16 pilots. 6 months is too long of a time for Ukraine’s most experienced pilots to be away from the battlefield during peak summer fighting season. It would be advisable for the U.S. to hold off on delivering Ukraine F-16s in favor of facilitating transfers of MiGs from Eastern European allies and retrofitting additional advanced Western weaponry onto those jets.
Aside from avoiding these specific weapons deliveries, the U.S. should consider what kinds of conditions it may want to attach to its future aid packages. With the 2022 midterm elections handing Republicans control of the U.S. House of Representatives, future Ukrainian aid packages will likely not be as large as the previous ones. While there remains a broad bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill that it is in America’s interests to continue supporting Ukraine, a growing faction within the Republican Party has expressed skepticism over what they see as “blank check” spending. In December, Congress appropriated enough aid (roughly USD 45B) to Ukraine to keep U.S. support steady through the 2023 fiscal year. However, that funding will run out by September, when Congress will have to pass a budget for FY2024. Republicans will likely push for any additional aid for Ukraine to come with some conditions, and it would behoove President Biden to consult with European allies as to what those might be.
While many might find the idea of conditioning aid for Ukraine to be a nonstarter, the simple fact remains that the U.S. is not in a position to commit such levels of economic and military support for an indefinite period of time. It is unlikely that the new Russian offensive, powered by undertrained conscripts and inexperienced officers, will result in significant territorial gains for Russia. It remains to be seen if Ukrainian counter-offensives will be able to maintain the gains that last year’s counteroffensive did. Should the war remain in the same stalemated position come September 2023, the U.S. should encourage Ukraine to consider the possibility of a negotiated halt to the fighting. It is highly unlikely that either Ukraine or Russia will suffer one final military defeat that decisively ends this conflict. Russia is incapable of forcing regime change in Kyiv, and Ukraine is unable to eject all Russian forces from its territory - including Crimea. The U.S. can and should maintain its current level of support for Ukraine, including providing them with advanced weaponry like HIMARS, GLSDB, and HARMs. However, it is time to recognize the strategic reality, that barring a massive shift in regional power dynamics or a direct NATO military intervention, the war is likely to remain in a stalemate for the foreseeable future.
The U.S. should work to fortify Ukraine’s defenses against a future Russian assault, pressure the European Union to fund the majority of Ukraine’s rebuilding effort, and assist Ukraine on its path to EU membership, provided a settlement can be reached with Russia over the status of the occupied territories in Crimea and the Donbas. American support for Ukraine has been crucial to its survival, but other strategic priorities can and will demand America’s attention. The U.S. must be careful about delivering highly specialized and advanced weaponry that might be of more use in other conflict scenarios, while also beginning the process of working with allies and Ukraine to determine what the ultimate diplomatic settlement to this conflict should look like.
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