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Rebalancing Priorities: Why Taiwan Deserves America's Focus Over the Middle East


By. Veronica Marcone

DOI: 10.57912/27089620

 

For decades, the United States has balanced its international military commitments, prioritizing key allies in both the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Indo-Pacific regions. As China’s influence expands and its threats against Taiwan grow more aggressive, it’s time for the U.S. to reassess where its military resources are most critically needed. Taiwan, a democratic island that stands as a bulwark against Chinese territorial ambitions, requires more immediate and substantial military support. This means shifting focus from partners in the MENA region—where long-standing concerns about human rights and misuse of U.S. defense equipment persist—and redirecting resources toward Taiwan, where the stakes for U.S. strategic interests are higher than ever.

 

According to Foreign Policy, Taiwan is competing for equipment that the U.S. primarily sells to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE. These countries are close allies and strategic partners of the U.S. in the MENA region, hence the strong support. The equipment delivered to these includes missiles, defense systems, Abraham tanks, and F-16s all of which make up a large portion of the Taiwanese backlog as we have seen earlier. 

 

There have also been concerns regarding Saudi Arabia and the UAE's adherence to end-use agreements. The air campaign led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE has caused significant civilian casualties likely amounting to war crimes in Yemen and raises questions about their compliance with said U.S. sales agreements. These end-user agreements are established as prerequisites of U.S. arms sales through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which authorize the delivery of weapons or the termination of these in the case of use for unauthorized purposes. The Saudi involvement in Yemen caused a severe humanitarian crisis, which is in potential violation of section 42(a) of the AECA: however non-enforceable, the section urges to consider whether a sale would “increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict”. Moreover, Section 3(a) of the AECA states that a prerequisite for eligibility is commitment to refrain from transferring the possession of U.S. defense articles to other entities, which has been violated by the two countries with findings of transfers to militias linked to al-Qaeda and other armed rebel groups in the Gulf region. According to the UN, there is credible evidence the UAE has been diverting U.S. military equipment to Sudanese paramilitary forces, known as Rapid Support Forces, which is fueling the ongoing civil war in Sudan. 

 

Furthermore, the FAA restricts sales of articles to customers that show a consistent pattern of gross violations of hold proof of having violated human rights. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated to commit human rights abuses both domestically and regionally. Investigations from the Washington Post have found concrete evidence of violation of international laws in both actors using mainly U.S. produced fighter jets. According to Reuters, the Biden administration has been questioning whether Saudi Arabia has respected this agreement, considering the crisis in Yemen and the killing of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi mandated by Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. 

 

Despite small steps to reduce casualties specifically in Yemen, the Biden administration has done little to completely halt sales to the two countries, which are considered crucial U.S. allies in the region. Aside from difficulties in addressing violations, these arms sales have often proceeded due to regulatory gaps that have allowed the Biden Administration to bypass congressional oversight. Examples of bypasses involve the sale of defense equipment valued at under $14 million per sale, or defense articles and services under $50 million per sale, as stated in the AECA. The Administration does not have the obligation to notify Congress in these cases. 

 

By redirecting the systems currently sold to Saudi Arabia and the UAE towards Taiwan, we can significantly reduce competition for these resources. This redirection is not driven by spite or a lack of interest in our Saudi and Emirati allies. Instead, it represents a strategic reassessment to ensure that the systems are less likely to be used in violation of U.S. laws. The objective is to gather clear evidence of these violations and amend the laws to be more transparent, eliminating any loopholes regarding sales and doubts related to possible unauthorized purposes. This approach would help free up the necessary equipment to support Taiwan, ensuring compliance with U.S. regulations and enhancing the overall effectiveness of our foreign military sales program.

 

The U.S. must rethink its defense priorities, shifting its focus from unreliable MENA partners to Taiwan, a key ally in the Indo-Pacific. By reallocating military resources and holding MENA countries accountable for their misuse of U.S. defense articles, the U.S. can better support Taiwan’s security needs. Prioritizing Taiwan’s defense not only strengthens its autonomy but also safeguards U.S. interests in a region where stability is increasingly threatened by China's rising power.

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