By Jackson Meisner
The Russian invasion of Ukraine caught many foreign policy analysts off guard. What was notable about the responses to the invasion was not who condemned the invasion, but who did not. While the United States, the European Union, and the governments of most European countries condemned the invasion, rightwing Eurosceptic parties, like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and National Rally (RN) in France, spoke out against EU and US efforts to sanction Russia. Some, such as the French National Rally MEP Thierry Mariani, even expressed open support for the state, going as far as to travel to the occupied Crimea in 2015 to praise Russia’s successful annexation of the region. As these parties continue to make gains in the governments of European countries, American policymakers would do well to consider the impact the illiberal populist right will have on not just the Ukraine War, but on European geopolitical ambitions as a whole.
Since the end of the Second World War, Western and Northern Europe have been geopolitically aligned with both the model of liberal democracy and the United States. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, western ideas of liberal democracy were expanded to central and eastern Europe. At the same time, many of these countries joined Western-aligned institutions like the European Union and NATO. However, in recent years, adherence to both liberal democracy and the United States has declined in Europe. This became increasingly apparent in the 2010s, which saw the victories of illiberal populists in Poland and Hungary and the success of the Brexit referendum in 2016. These parties have a fundamentally different view on geopolitics compared even to more established right-wing parties. They are more nationalistic, Eurosceptic, less trustful of the United States, and more willing to praise and work with Russia. Understanding the geopolitical preferences of the European far-right is essential for American policy makers as these parties continue to grow in stature and power.
The impact of the European far-right is by no means theoretical. It has already done lasting damage to the unity of the European Union. One of the more well-known cases is that of Hungary under Viktor Orban. Despite the history of Russo-Hungarian relations during the Cold War, the Orban government has consistently attempted to weaken and delegitimize the EU position against Russia. It has done so most prominently through its stance on the Russia-Ukraine War, opposing the delivery of weapons to Ukraine and hampering efforts to potentially integrate the country into the EU. Furthermore, Orban’s government vigorously opposed energy sanctions against the Russian government and accused the Ukrainian government of discriminating against ethnic Hungarians in Western Ukraine. This last accusation is particularly notable, as it echoes Russian propaganda talking points regarding claims of “genocide” against Russian speakers in Donetsk and Luhansk. These actions, alongside others from nations like Serbia under Alexander Vucic and Slovakia under Robert Fico, show that there is a growing constituency within Europe for a pro-Russia sentiment that is already affecting the geopolitical alignment of the region.
The example of Hungary reveals another reason for the illiberal right’s support for Russia. The ideological precepts of Putin’s Russia, ultranationalism, social conservatism, and illiberalism, are deeply appealing to these parties. To strengthen pro-Russia solidarity in Europe, Russia has spent large amounts of money cultivating connections among the leadership of far-right parties in Europe. Russian propaganda plays into these ideological predispositions by portraying Russia as a vanguard of traditional Christian values in contrast to the secular West. Putin’s statements about supposed Western attempts to destroy traditional Russian cultural values are mirrored by language from far-right groups who speak against cultural changes within the West. Putin’s personal style of illiberal leadership has long drawn admiration from far-right figures like Matteo Salvini in Italy, who tweeted in 2017 that his political opponent, Matteo Renzi, was “not worth even a little finger of the Russian president.” The European far-right is drawn to Putin because they see Russia as the ideal country: a proud nationalist state ruled by a powerful leader willing to use force to defend national sovereignty.
While the European far-right has yet to seriously derail EU or US policy in Europe, the United States should still be wary of the potential for further gains by the far-right. The popularity of the far-right continues to rise in several nations. The AfD in Germany consistently polls as the second most popular party, and France's President Emmanuel Macron is in danger of losing his role to the ultra-conservative Marine Le Pen. In order to counter this threat and to preserve the EU as a stable partner against Russian aggression, the US should collaborate with European nations to identify and combat Russian misinformation. Efforts must also be taken to discredit, delegitimize, and isolate pro-Russia politicians while, at the same time, working with them to moderate their actions and rhetoric. This strategy was successful when working with the Prime Minister of Italy, Giorgia Meloni, who was willing to moderate her party’s policy to send aid to Ukraine. While the current threat from the illiberal far-right is manageable at the moment, the US should not get complacent. Tackling this issue now is the best and only way to ensure that Russia loses influence in Europe and that the continent’s broad geopolitical orientation stays aligned with the United States.
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