By David Brostoff
In recent years, competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China has severely intensified. With the conclusion of the Cold War and the beginning of the “Unipolar Moment,” the U.S. worked to create a world order that upholds its status on the global stage. But not every state hopes to preserve Pax Americana. Dissatisfied with the status quo, China seeks to cast off the yoke of American hegemony; in its absence, it hopes to become the dominant force in the world. Such a reality would be devastating to the United States.
China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific clearly demonstrate its lust for power, and Taiwan appears to be its primary target. President Xi Jinping has vowed the “reunification” of Taiwan and China, indicating his deep desire to capture the island. In an effort to intimidate the Taiwanese people into submission, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China habitually enters Taiwan’s air defense zone. In the last six months alone, the PLA conducted over 555 sorties into Taiwanese territory. Moreover, between August 4 and 7, China conducted a series of live-fire drills circling the island. China’s blatant aggression suggests the serious possibility of a Chinese invasion, leaving many Americans to wonder: should the United States come to Taiwan’s defense?
Any prudent and thoughtful position on the issue must address two fundamental questions: will it impact the balance of power, and is success probable?
Addressing the former, Taiwan plays a central role in managing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. Left unchecked to conquer Taiwan, China would have a direct link to the First Island Chain—a chain of archipelagos that stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula. With this access, China will have the opportunity to tip the balance in its favor and militarily assert itself in the region. As Elbridge Colby suggests, Taiwan’s geostrategic positioning would allow China to “project dominating power against U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.” Moreover, if China captures Taiwan, many of our weaker partners and allies in the region may ally themselves with China. Fearing for their futures, these states may hedge their bets on China rather than incur punishments—whether military, political, or economic—for collaborating with the United States; these smaller states would rather bandwagon with China than “suffer what they must.” If the U.S. does not come to Taiwan’s defense, China will have a clear path to dominate the Indo-Pacific region, and the fate of American power will be in jeopardy.
The largest continental economy, Asia makes up 39% of global GDP. If China successfully dominates the region, it will create and dictate the rules of the regional economy. As a result, it will have the ability to exclude the U.S. from Asia’s economy. By limiting the United States’ access to 60% of the world population, the U.S. would lose access to a valuable export market, causing its national economy to suffer tremendously. Retaking Taiwan is China’s first step toward making this vision a reality. To prevent a regional Chinese hegemony, the U.S. must be prepared to defend the island.
The fundamental importance of an autonomous Taiwan for the contemporary balance of power suggests that the United States ought to defend the island in the face of an invasion. However, American statesmen must also take a long, hard look at the U.S.’ capabilities and recognize the limits of our country's military power. Senior RAND Corporation analyst David Ochmanek reported, "In our [war] games, when we fight Russia and China, blue gets its ass handed to it.” When RAND runs wargames and simulations of military conflict in partnership with the United States Department of Defense, the U.S. military often loses against Chinese and Russian forces. Ochmanek is not the only person to report this reality. The National Defense Strategy Commission revealed a similar finding in its 2018 report: “If the United States had to fight … China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat.” It is a disheartening reality but one that Americans must face: our military capabilities may not prevail in a conflict with China halfway across the globe.
Frankly, it would be imprudent for the U.S. to embark on a military campaign that it cannot win, as a decisive loss may prove even more devastating to American power and prestige than if it were to let Taiwan fall by itself. This is an essential lesson that American statesmen should take from the ancient historian Thucydides. Near the end of the Peloponnesian War, Athens wanted to increase its relative power by capturing Sicily. Against this decision, one general, Nicias, made a case for restraint, warning the Athenians that they would likely lose the conflict. Nonetheless, Athens committed to the Sicilian Expedition, and Nicias’ prediction was realized: Athens was severely brutalized; its power was undermined; and its empire eventually collapsed. If the United States hopes to avoid the fate of the Athenians, it must learn from the failures of the past and reject a war that it cannot win.
Indeed, this leaves a tension in the debate over a U.S. defense of Taiwan: on the one hand, the balance of power must be protected, but on the other, a decisive loss may be more detrimental to the United States’ relative power. The future that the RAND Corporation and National Defense Strategy Commission predicted is by no means inevitable. In fact, the U.S. has been studying its wargame losses to develop winning strategies. The United States needs to get serious about the issue and prepare to overcome its deficiency against China. The U.S. must retract itself from commitments that are not vital to its interests in order to allocate military and economic resources to Asia; it must focus on restoring its weakened industrial base; it must build a “more lethal force” that is prepared for conflict in the Indo-Pacific; and it must develop military agreements with existing partners and allies—such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia—to come to Taiwan’s defense; and it must continue to arm Taiwan itself. Our window of opportunity is closing, and we must build and prepare our capabilities to defeat China’s threat. If we fail to take destiny into our own hands, the costs of defending Taiwan will outweigh the benefits of doing so.
Foreign policy decisions are seldom made by distinguishing the “right” from the “wrong” decision. They operate in shades of gray. A fog of uncertainty will always cloud our foresight, and statesmen are left to recommend and execute the policies that seem to be of lesser evils. This is the crux of the Taiwan question. On one level, an autonomous Taiwan is necessary to preserve the balance of power, but we may face a humiliating defeat that catalyzes the ultimate decline of American power and influence. The alternative is to leave Taiwan to fight for itself and anticipate its capitulation. The first choice is preferable, provided we can improve our outlook. Achieving this goal will not be an easy feat; it will require keen strategic thought and a robust will to power. This will be the challenge for the future generation of American statesmen: to do what is expedient in order to remain competitive in the world.
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