By Patrick Alexander
Many pundits saw 2016, the year of Brexit and the rise of many far-right populist parties in Europe, as an alarming trend towards illiberalism and a fractured continent. Adding to these fears was the increase in Russian aggression, displayed through interference in the UK’s vote to leave the European Union and the invasion of Crimea two years prior. American leadership, a traditional stabilizer, was hijacked by isolationism and an “America-first” ideology, resulting in Twitter spats and trade wars for the public to watch and worry over. Amid increasing inter-bloc squabbles, it seemed the global order would turn against the European experiment.
Fortunately, these fears proved short-lived. The major European powers of Germany and France were led by the steady hands of Merkel and Macron, which kept the continent united against Russian threats and American hawkishness amidst years of instability. Although Brexit became a tense and prolonged process, worsened by frequent leadership shifts in Downing Street, necessary lines of communication between the EU and the UK remained open to resolving COVID-19 vaccine disputes. The collective response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was paramount evidence of a unified Europe. Although once a pariah to the European community, Britain sent armed vehicles, javelin missiles, medical aid, and financing to Ukraine. Germany committed to sending tanks to Ukraine while also taking the lead in EU sanctions against Russian oil, a policy of particular note considering its historical pacifism and energy dependency. During this overarching effort within the bloc’s international system, the case for liberalism on the national level was made in the Czech Republic with the election of Petr Pavel.
Petr Pavel made a name for himself in the Czech army; of particular significance was his service in a UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia during which he led a dangerous but successful evacuation of under-fire French forces. His calm demeanor in the face of imminent danger earned him medals and respect from his comrades. He went on to serve as NATO’s military committee chair, advising the Secretary-General and keeping lines of communication with Russian counterparts open amidst the Russian invasion of Crimea. He emerged later as an independent candidate for the presidency, with social liberal and center-right support, against 10-year Prime Minister Milos Zeman.
Pavel’s election means a victory for several important stances of the EU. He is a proponent of Ukraine’s membership in the European Union and has been open to increasing military aid to Ukraine. Since beginning his work inside international institutions, Pavel has been a staunch defender of NATO and the EU and has advocated for the strengthening of the Visegrad Four alliance between the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. Pavel has also made clear his stance on China, which favors Europe taking a harder line against Chinese influence and supporting Taiwan. While not in lockstep with Pavel, the Czech parliament has made clear it will support him in important foreign issues, especially those dealing with Taiwan. An unprecedented visit to the island is scheduled for late March by the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, along with 150 political, legal, and business leaders of the Czech Republic. The importance of these policies is further emphasized when considering the principles of the previous Zeman administration, which sought to position the Czech Republic as “China’s gateway to Europe” and was a frequent defender of Russia before its invasion of Ukraine.
However, Pavel’s election and reversal of policies in the Czech Republic did not wash out concerns skeptics have about European leaders. Deteriorating civil rights and democratic norms in Poland and Hungary have, reasonably, attracted international attention and outcry. Meanwhile, the election of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of Italy provided a far-right boogeywoman to liberal sensibilities, generating headlines calling her “a danger to Italy and the rest of Europe.” In fairness, her present ties to the alt-right are concerning— as is her past defense of Russia against EU efforts. However, since assuming office, she has performed an abrupt reversal on many of her more extreme positions. She blocked an acquisition effort by a Kremlin-linked tech company for an Italian cloud services provider while also making a public appeal for more weapons for Ukraine. She has also cooperated with the terms of the EU-mandated Recovery and Resilience Facility program, leading to a boom in investment and debt management for the cash-strapped country. On the home front, she led her party to condemn fascism in October of last year and has excommunicated extremist members of her party who pushed a complementary history of that era. However, this move towards the center has not been mirrored in Poland and Hungary, and more work can be done to guarantee democratic norms in those countries. Despite its polarization, Poland has played an instrumental role in providing Ukraine with aid and refugee support along the border, as public support of the EU reaches a new height years after “Polexit” was popular in the Polish lexicon. Hungary’s record on supporting Ukraine and the European Union is less clear, ranging from direct bilateral help to the holding up of European efforts. It has become clear that Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, sees the crisis as an opportunity to air his grievances against the EU but is willing to still fund armed resistance to any party against Vladimir Putin. All in all, these alleged worst-case scenarios, Pavel’s victory, and a cohesive European response in Russia paint a strong and unified picture of the continent.
Ultimately, the European experiment remains tenuous, but there remain many causes for hope. Internationally, the European community, within and beyond the EU, has produced a coordinated response to Russian aggression in defense of shared ideals. Nationally, Petr Pavel has proven that, even in countries where the specter of authoritarianism looms large, liberal ideas can still cut through the dark. Even the supposed worst-case scenario of Giorgia Meloni cast European integration as her starting point, and Poland and Hungary’s internal troubles avoid casting a pall on external efforts. The doomsayers for European liberalism can now devote their attention to the immediate threat of Russia instead of internal decay. As for the American observer, apart from the important work that must be done in guaranteeing human rights in Poland and Hungary, Europe can firmly be counted as a united front— and one receptive to the causes of democracy and liberty. Thus, the same appeals and actors used to secure support for Ukraine can be a template for securing European support for Taiwan. In the meantime, supporting a united and liberal Europe, including its leaders, should dictate American continental strategy post-Ukraine.
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