By Morgan Sattler
On November 2, North Korea fired one of 25 missiles toward South Korea in the midst of joint military exercises with the U.S., triggering not only the air raid sirens of its southern neighbor but emergency lockdowns in Japan as well. What resulted was an equivalent response from South Korean F-15K and KF-16 fighter jets, which fired three missiles that plummeted northward into the ocean. Hours before, North Korea’s top military official, Pak Jong-chon, had demanded that South Korea and the U.S. seize Operation Vigilant Storm, a joint military exercise intended to bolster deterrence and cooperation, on account of their “aggressive” actions in pursuit of toppling the regime. To anyone unfamiliar with the issue, this would appear to be just another provocation from North Korea. The hermit kingdom has been antagonizing state actors in the East Asia region for months, most notably when Hwasong-12, the intermediate-range ballistic missile, soared over the width of Japan at the beginning of October. The reality is that this situation is much, much more different. North Korea’s provocation crossed a line --the Northern Limit Line to be exact-- which hasn’t been crossed since 1953, the year North Korea and South Korea signed the armistice to halt the Korean War.
Not only does this demonstrate that North Korea is motivated by fear and insecurity, it demonstrates that the deterrence strategies that the United States and its allies have implemented have lost their integrity. Kim Jong Un didn’t happen to stumble over this red line, it was simply a situation long in the making. Countless condemnations from the U.S. and its allies in response to Kim Jong Un’s missile tests have proved to be fruitless, as they do not deter North Korea nor change the minds of state actors, such as Russia and China, who enable it. That much is true when accounting for the variety of 50 missiles launched by North Korea this year so far, which marks a record high for the nation. As of June, it was estimated that North Korea had already spent 2% of its GDP on conducting ballistic missile tests, making it clear that sanctions have not been a major obstacle to the weapons program. A criminal state that can circumvent sanctions as quickly as it receives them is not deterred by the prospect of being dealt more, especially not when it is backed by China. China has enabled North Korea through trade opportunities and cyber training, a move which has emulated the opening of Pandora’s Box.
With all of the financial roadblocks placed in the physical world, North Korea has turned to the cyber field, and its advancing nuclear program is a sign of its success. The nation sources the funds to support those expenses by conducting bank hacks, cryptocurrency heists, and money laundering. U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber Security, Anne Neuberger, estimated earlier this year that North Korea generates “up to a third of their funds for their missile program” through cybercrime. While North Korea might have significant cyber capabilities, the reality is that these attacks are happening due to a heavier focus on accountability measures than preventative measures. No constructive outcome is produced by inditing individuals that will likely never touch U.S. soil, as was done in response to the WannaCry ransomware attack on Sony Pictures in 2018. The United States response to the North Korean threat has relied too heavily on naming and shaming strategies and the usual sanctions, much like it has with North Korea’s missile testing. Of course, both these deterrence strategies have their use. Still, given that there are no signs that North Korea will change its behavior, we require a reestablished, consistent, and innovative cyberdeterrence strategy: one that learns from the past and prepares for the future.
When the ‘left-of-launch’ strategy surfaced in the early 2010’s, the U.S. wasn’t ready for it. The idea of pre-emptively preventing the enemy from launching their missiles through a cyberattack was a game too dangerous to play, especially since the rewards of past attempts remain unclear. Intimidated by the risks associated with such an approach, and even realized by a backfired operation, authorities allowed the missile defense tactic to fade in favor of safer options. The reality is that the times -and the battlefields- have changed, and the U.S. is due to adapt. That means bringing back an updated version of the ‘left-of-launch’ strategy, one that is developed based on the highest rate of success in interfering with the missile system’s function with the least risk of exposure. Missile systems are very vulnerable to cyberattacks because the missile’s command and control and information transmission to the launch facility and the missile in flight depend on technology. There are many devices and stages of launch at which malware could interfere. Done right, the malware will lie undetected until launch, and the victim won’t know whether it was a flaw in the hardware or an attack on the software. Of course, the U.S. must strengthen its defense at home to ensure that it reduces its vulnerability to cyberattacks in general and from the blowback caused by its cyber operations. The U.S. Cyber Command has already taken steps in the right direction by releasing cybersecurity objectives to the public for their use.
Not only does the United States have to reconsider its strategy, it has to step up support for its allies in Asia as well. North Korea’s fear-mongering has effectively cast Japan and South Korea into a shadow of doubt. Their security in the East Asia region relies heavily on the United States, which is why it is crucial that it continues to reassure them of the available support. Again, the United States has already demonstrated a willingness to rise to the challenge by conducting joint cyber exercises and military exercises with South Korea.
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