Loosening Russia’s Grip: How the U.S. Can Grow Closer to Central Asia

By. Luke Redetzke

DOI: 10.57912/27912975

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In April 2024, the Kyrgyz Republic passed legislation mimicking Russia’s “foreign agents” law, copying 98% of the original document. The law requires NGOs who receive foreign funding to register with the government, allowing the government to restrict their activities. Cloudy language obscures exactly how NGOs will be treated, but NGOs operating in Russia publicized that they ran into difficulties under the designation of “foreign agent”. Although the U.S. has held conferences with Central Asian states to demonstrate the value of their cooperation, the lack of civilian pushback in Kyrgyzstan speaks to the people’s lack of concern over more exclusive relations with Russia. In contrast, a similar bill was passed in Georgia soon after, which produced more public backlash. The distinction between the cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan is the level of Western investment in each country. Western countries bolstered their commitment to Georgia by supporting its infrastructure, while nothing comparable has been done in Kyrgyzstan. Despite a public commitment to the region and the geopolitical importance of that commitment, Western countries have done little to back it. If the U.S. and its allies hope to truly isolate Russia, it is crucial to prove to the people of Central Asia that they are committed to the region and that there will be a clear benefit to closer trade with the United States.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the countries that emerged in Central Asia had the opportunity to forge new alliances and redefine their politics. Although Russia has a head start in influencing internal politics due to over a century of involvement in the region, these countries are quickly integrating into the global economy. An American-led effort to replace Russia has partially taken hold, but it is far from established. Central Asia is in a negotiating position and will continue to maximize its profits through the war in Ukraine. The region is extremely wealthy in natural resources, possesses high agricultural potential, and has been an alternative source of energy and resources to Russia since 2022. As states refuse to take a stance on the Ukraine War, they are also hosts to re-exports that directly support Russian military activities.

Furthermore, China and Russia have since been the most prominent investors in the region. Between the Belt and Road Initiative, natural gas pipelines, and nuclear energy facilities, America’s two greatest adversaries have provided the most to Central Asian infrastructure. In recent years, however, the U.S. has ramped up its investment in the region. Since 2015, the C5+1 summit has annually been held to improve diplomatic relations between Washington and its Central Asian counterparts, with the first presidential summit being in 2023 in New York City. As recently as June of this year, the United States-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA) released a joint statement affirming the importance of the group’s collaboration in improving the trade capacity.

Increased investment in infrastructure by Western governments and private industry into Central Asia would pull the region away from Russia, and further the country’s isolation. The case of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan contrasts the people’s attitude, given Western investment. Pushback against the “foreign agents” law in Kyrgyzstan was quite limited comparedto that of Georgia, in part because U.S. aid to Georgia is almost three times that of Kyrgyzstan. The implementation of certain programs has even caught the attention of neighboring countries; for example, some Armenians hold aspirations of obtaining Georgian citizenship due to the hundreds of millions of dollars that have funded a project to eliminate hepatitis. German investment in construction has also significantly impacted the lives of Georgians. While water could not run in anything taller than a three story building, it now runs in as tall as forty stories. Therefore, it is no surprise that, following the passing of the foreign agents law, 50,000 Georgians took to the streets of Tbilisi, compared to the few NGOs protesting the Kyrgyz parliament. If citizens are to pushback against more exclusive relations with Russia, they need to first experience the benefits of Western investment.

The political direction of Central Asia towards more exclusive relations with Russia will further support Russia’s geopolitical interests. Kazakhstan, for example, has been a major factor in bypassing Western sanctions to obtain oil and grain. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan became a medium for goods with military potential, supporting Russia’s activities in Ukraine. Since 2022, Russia has also sought to strengthen its relations with Turkmenistan–home to one of the largest natural gas reserves in the world–with whom it lost favor to China a decade before. Central Asia became Putin’s fallback in financing and supporting his war, and whatever plans he holds for the future. The region’s future, if it remains close to Russia, is murky. Facing energy shortages and outdated infrastructure, success largely depends on that of Russia.

Nevertheless, this is a risk Central Asian states must take. Unlike the United States and Russia, their priority in diplomacy is not political alliances, but rather economic stability. For example, the recent dialogue between Kazakhstan and the U.S. “prioritized trade relations and food security over more intractable issues” such as affiliation with Russia. However, the two-sided character of these countries is not intended to leverage political conflict for their benefit; rather, Central Asian countries cannot afford to pick a side. Until they are certain that they will not continue to be isolated, they will maintain trade with Russia. Given a clear priority for economic growth and stability, the best chance at swaying these nations away from Russia is to commit to the region. While an existing economic reliance on Russia, and especially China, complicates a shift to trade with Western countries, meaningful action and repealing barriers on behalf of the U.S. and its allies have the power to sway Central Asian states. 

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has focused predominantly on the post-Soviet nations of East Europe. To better commit to the region, the U.S. must reexamine its trade policy with Central Asia, such as repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which was passed in 1974 to economically pressure Soviet-bloc, non-market economies to allow more free Jewish migration, has been repealed in Eastern Europe; and although the conditions of the amendment are irrelevant, its trade restrictions remain in place for Central Asia. Still, the U.S. has refocused on the region in recent years, but while there seems to be increased trade, it greatly favors Kazakhstan. Much of the infrastructure in Central Asia flows from China and Russia, and removing Kazakhstan from the equation shows the U.S. to largely be absent in the region. Thus, it should not come as a surprise when they take up Russia on offers for energy support, even if it means serving as a medium for circumventing sanctions. As David Miliband, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, acknowledges, smaller, weaker states cannot afford to pick sides, and so they will take whatever help comes their way. 

The U.S. must repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in Central Asia and overshadow its adversaries’ support for infrastructure in the region. Multilateral efforts to support energy independence through funding nuclear facilities, as is a stated goal of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, would ease the current energy crisis in Central Asia (as well as provide an alternative to Russian projects). This ultimately puts the West’s words into action and can convince Central Asian allies that they can afford to pick a side. Using Georgia as a model, the United States and its allies can be sure that the recipients will be positively swayed by the stability and reliability of Western institutions. Considering the implications of the status quo in Central Asian politics, the West should reanalyze its alliances in the region to limit Russia’s viable alternatives to sanctions.