By Nick Gelston
The term hydro-hegemony was coined by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner in 2006. Hydro-hegemony, according to these scholars, is “hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration, and containment. The strategies are executed through an array of tactics (e.g. coercion-pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international institutional context.”
The Nile River, which runs through eleven African countries, is a victim of hydro-hegemony. Egypt has been a hegemon along the river for a considerable amount of time, causing tensions with upstream riparian states, largely Ethiopia. In more recent years, Ethiopia has challenged Egypt’s position as the hegemon with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a $4.2 billion project that started in 2011. The dam is expected to double Ethiopia's production of electricity, allowing its population to have wider access to the river’s resources. However, Egypt and Sudan have voiced worries over the project due to the fear that it will greatly reduce the stream of the Nile. Despite this contention, the GERD’s final phase of filling was completed in September of 2023.
The Nile River has been the subject of several agreements pertaining to its use. In 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement was settled by Britain and Egypt, and, in 1959, Egypt and Sudan arranged the Agreement for Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters. Noticeably, neither agreement included Ethiopia; the state rejects the 1959 agreement, citing a rule which states that treaties do not create obligations or rights for third parties without their consent. Under the belief it is not bound by the existing treaty between Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia took a strong stance and built the GERD to gain access to water it was previously restricted from using. The GERD is a momentous project for the people of Ethiopia. In a country where only forty-five percent of the population had access to electricity in 2018, the dam's ability to double production holds understandable excitement. Abbis Ababa hopes to provide guaranteed availability to “secure and reliable electricity supply” by 2030. To Ethiopia, the GERD is a way to change the status quo and help its people while avoiding any hostility towards Egypt or Sudan’s usage of the Nile.
Due to the many treaties imposed in the region, Egypt has been a hegemon along the Nile for decades. The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement was created for the purpose of increasing the volume of water reaching Egypt. Yet, the agreement simultaneously gave Egypt substantial control over projects on the Nile and emphasized Great Britain's recognition of Egypt’s “natural and historic rights” to the waters. The 1959 Agreement for Full Utilization of the Nile Waters allotted Egypt about 64 percent of the Nile's annual flow. Egypt has made it very clear that it opposes the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The foreign ministry has said that even a 2% decrease in the flow of the Nile could cause a loss of 200,000 acres of irrigated land. Recent talks over the dam included Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia but did not end on a conclusive note. Ultimately, Egypt’s water ministry placed the blame on Ethiopia for the failure to reach a consensus, claiming it was opposed to any compromise. The disagreement over the GERD has mainly been between Ethiopia and Egypt. However, Sudan is caught in the middle – both physically and figuratively. At the start of the dam's construction, Sudan held a more accepting attitude towards Ethiopia. In recent years, that attitude has shifted to being more suspicious of Ethiopia's plans. During the third filling of the GERD in 2022, Sudan publicly voiced its frustration with Ethiopia, claiming the country failed to take into account the damage that Sudan would incur as a result of the filling.
A solution to this complex issue will not come easy, as every attempt before has failed due to each party's interests. In order to move forward, the two previous agreements would need to be nullified by a new solution – one which includes Ethiopia. It is important that, while still considering Egypt and Sudan’s dependence on the Nile, the states also consider Ethiopia's needs. This can be done by creating a regional organization, similar to the Southern African Development Community, centered around water management on the Nile River. All countries along the Nile would be part of this organization and would have the opportunity to collaborate and negotiate.
In addition to more efficient negotiations, the organization would be able to provide the countries with better infrastructure development and river management. With a shared goal, states would be able to create the mutual infrastructure needed to take care of agriculture, produce electricity, create jobs, and increase revenue for further development. After the organization is created and produces a mutually beneficial solution, it should continue to monitor developments along the Nile and provide stability within the region.
Though countries along the Nile are capable of creating a regional organization centered around the river's management, larger international organizations, such as the United Nations, should step up and offer additional help in ensuring a stable foundation. Once the organization is operational and has shown promising results, the United Nations can take a step back and allow the member countries to take full control.
Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan all have different opinions on the GERD and its effects in the region. The disagreement can and should be resolved through a new regional organization whose primary purpose is to foster cooperation and manage the river's allocation and development. Without a solution, the disagreement over the GERD and the allocation of the Nile may only worsen, inflaming tensions and setting a possible foundation for future hostilities.
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