By Callum Nelson
DOI: 10.57912/25521067
Between the 11th and 12th of January, the United States and the United Kingdom organized missile strikes against 60 Houthi targets in Yemen. While foreign intervention in Yemen is hardly a novel concept, the response from US allies has been fickle. Saudi Arabia, despite leading an anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen for almost eight years, has not shown any direct support for the U.S. policy. These strikes display a shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards closer ties to China and Iran. This transition is likely encouraged by Mohammad Bin Salman’s (MBS) efforts to secure his Vision 2030 development plan, which requires sustained peace in the region and access to Yemen’s southern coast.
Proximity to the hostile and Iran-affiliated extraneous actor combined with Crown Prince MBS’s ambitious Vision 2030 plan has historically provided ample drive within Riyadh to support anti-Houthi action. The day of the U.S. missile strikes the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry published a statement which expressed “great concern” and called for “self-restraint and avoiding escalation.” This response begs the question: What makes Saudi Arabia so reluctant to endorse missile strikes this time?
Since 2004, the Zaydi-Shiite Houthi group has been attempting to overthrow Yemen’s primarily Sunni government. In 2014, the Houthis captured Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, and quickly expanded across the north of the country. Founded in part to combat Saudi political influence in Yemen, the Houthis have been in open combat with the Sunni state since their inception. An invasion in 2009 followed by a Saudi-led coalition's airstrikes in 2015 have contributed to raised tensions between the two neighboring actors, with the lasting effects coloring their relationship until recently. Furthermore, the Saudi government has alleged that Iran, a historic rival from across the Persian Gulf, has been funding, training, and arming the rebellion. Though Iran denies this claim, the United States and Saudi Arabia provided physical evidence of Iranian arms deals in 2018.
The Houthi militia and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps benefit from maintaining a degree of separation. While Iran does provide some support to Houthi rebels, financial funding is relatively limited ($100 million a year for the last 5-8 years, compared to the $700 million annually provided to Hezbollah, a figure estimated by US officials). For Iran, this style of support without direct control leaves them attributable, but with a veil of deniability. On the other hand, while the Houthis gain political and social legitimacy from conflict with the U.S. – presenting themselves as protectors of the citizens of Palestine being targeted by Israel and the West—they themselves seem to have few valuable assets that can be targeted by missile strikes. No matter how many leaders and commanders are targeted, there is always another ready to step in and direct operations. While Tehran and the Houthis do have significant cultural and strategic overlap, there is much to lose if Houthi aggression provokes Western retaliation against Iran. Thus, it is difficult to decisively conclude to what extent the Iranian government is directly involved in the planning and execution of Houthi attacks. This makes the support for intervention difficult for the U.S. to garner, as seen by Saudi Arabia, Italy, and France all declining to join the naval force in the South Red Sea. Another concern is that Iran might attempt to initiate on-the-ground conflict with the U.S. following any kind of involvement in Yemen. All recent statements by the Iranian foreign ministry seem to exist counter to this idea, however, warning instead that these actions will contribute to further “insecurity and instability” in the region.
Saudi Arabia also proactively engaged in diplomatic talks with Houthi leaders in Yemen during this time, opting to abandon its original military objectives (to eliminate the Houthi rebellion) in the region. It instead revised its goals to center the safeguarding of its southern border and limits on foreign influence (Iran, UAE, Türkiye) within Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s negotiations were ultimately successful; on December 23rd, 2023, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi leadership agreed to a ceasefire.
While the now-expired ceasefire plans no longer act in service of the Saudi Arabian government, recent Chinese pressure combined with overwhelming Saudi public reproach for Israeli and US military action in Gaza has made it difficult for Riyadh to show support for the West in Yemen. Many Saudis have taken intervention in Yemen as a sign that the U.S. is fighting Israel’s battles for them. This puts Saudi leadership in a difficult position, as the United States is still the primary security provider for the country. According to a survey conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 96% of Saudi Arabians surveyed believe that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” This pressure from citizens has also made China’s non-action approach to Middle East policy more attractive to MBS.
Saudi Arabia has immense strategic and diplomatic importance for the U.S., which seeks to limit Iran’s influence in the Persian Gulf and to resolve diplomatic conflict in other regions like Sudan and Syria. This makes China’s diplomatic success in the Middle East a point of significant concern, as any further weakening of the U.S. position relative to Iran could threaten its ability to impose their influence on the state. Beijing continues to exercise its diplomatic muscle in the Middle East—having recently brokered a tentative détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the latter half of 2023. The U.S., on the other hand, was unable to accomplish equal feats during its tenure as a security provider in the region. Thus, the U.S. must consider the implications of reduced influence in the Middle East and gauge whether a reexamination of their relationship with Saudi Arabia is necessary.
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