By Timothy Farrelly
Amidst intense droughts, floods, and access issues, the world faces a dire water crisis. The United Nations estimates that 2.2 billion people lack access to safely managed drinking water and that 4.2 billion people lack access to adequate sanitation services. Climate change is inevitably driving the water crisis by coupling already water-scarce regions with prolonged dry seasons. To alleviate water stress and solve the water crisis, states must look to bolster their water sovereignty, in other words, to maximize their water resources, by investing in water infrastructure, irrigation systems, desalination facilities, and more.
One such means of bolstering water sovereignty is to invest in hydroelectric dams. Dams provide states with the opportunity to not only increase their water supply but also offer an outlet for producing renewable energy. Additionally, dams can be an indispensable tool for economic development. Dams have the means of creating jobs, improving irrigation resulting in higher crop yields, and allowing a state to become energy independent and even a net exporter of electricity which can support the development of a region.
It is clear that in the 21st century, as the climate and water crises become more sinister, more states situated on rivers will need to turn to dams as a tool for adapting to extreme weather developments and creating new economic opportunities. However, it also happens that 276 rivers in the world are transboundary rivers, shared by two or more states. This renders the unilateral construction of a dam a hotly contested issue within a river basin by threatening water access to nations and communities downstream. Especially in arid regions, one can expect more states to turn to water infrastructure on rivers to bolster their water sovereignty. Yet, when done unilaterally this act runs the risk of escalating tensions with a lower riparian state that is also desperate to maximize its water resources in light of prolonged dry seasons and increasing populations.
On the Blue Nile River, Ethiopia’s unilateral act of constructing and operating the Grand Ethiopian Rennaissance Dam (GERD) is damaging relations with lower riparians Sudan and Egypt. The dam is now the largest in Africa and it is set to make Ethiopia energy independent, and a prominent energy exporter in the Horn of Africa. This is a positive development for the country and exemplifies how maximizing water resources can lead to economic development and prosperous relations with neighboring states. However, the situation is viewed quite differently in Khartoum and Cairo. According to the Water Stress Index (WSI), Sudan faces “high” water stress and Egypt faces “extremely high stress.” Indeed, Ethiopia does not rely on any water that originates outside of its borders, whereas 96% of Sudan’s water and 98% percent of Egypt’s originates abroad — primarily in Ethiopia. All the while, Ethiopia has refused to sign a binding water agreement with its lower riparians.
In response, Egypt has increased its military cooperation with Sudan — and it does not seem to be a coincidence. In 2020 the two carried out joint air exercises dubbed the “Nile Eagles,” and in May 2021 they conducted joint ground and air exercises nicknamed the “Guardians of the Nile,” both alluding to the defensive position the countries are taking in response to Ethiopia’s unilateral actions.
The question remains over whether or not states will actually take the risk of entering a hard conflict over water resources. Historically, there is just one instance of water war at the state level and has traditionally been used as a weapon of war rather than a cause of war.
Many scholars argue that wars fought for control of freshwater will not actually come to fruition and that, on the contrary, water scarcity drives cooperation. For instance, with water levels dropping in important reservoirs in the Colorado River basin, the U.S. and Mexico signed the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan in which both pledged to reduce water use. Water can also lead to institution building, even between the most hostile of neighbors. India and Pakistan have cooperated peacefully in the Indus River basin since signing the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 despite the violent dispute in Kashmir. Oftentimes such institution building culminates in the joint construction and operation of a dam or other water infrastructure that benefits all parties.
However, the international community should not turn its back on monitoring cases of clean water scarcity in contentious political zones. Military escalation by both Egypt and Sudan along with Ethiopia’s unilateralism and reluctance to acquiesce to a binding multilateral water-sharing agreement could lead to an undesired conflict. In such hotspot zones of high hydro-political risk (river basins shared by states with conflictive relations) international organizations should exhaust all diplomatic means to encourage parties to sign effective water agreements.
Ultimately, water disputes that incite political conflict between uncooperative riparians should be settled by larger international bodies before the conflict worsens. Countries affected by water scarcity and climate change that share a river basin should pursue agreements that create institutions that will incentivize and prioritize cooperative relations. An ideal agreement would include provisions for water and hydroelectric sharing, adaptability for changing climate realities, side payments that supplement cooperation by creating a financial incentive, monitoring, and a joint commission to deal with conflict resolution in the basin. Additionally, countries can further cooperate if they opt to construct infrastructure like dams multilaterally rather than unilaterally. The joint operation guarantees that all partners will benefit from its use.
Given that the global water crisis is set to worsen due to climate change, it is of little surprise to see the Blue Nile grow more contested. Ethiopia is effectively reversing the power dynamics on the river and has taken the role of its hydro-hegemon. Egypt and Sudan have a responsibility to secure their citizens’ right to safe, accessible, and affordable water. However, there are pathways to a peaceful settlement. For instance, Addis Ababa can utilize GERD to sell electricity to Sudan and Egypt. They can also regulate the flow of the Nile by storing excess water from the seasonal wet season in the summer and regulate a more consistent perennial flow. Khartoum and Cairo can compensate Ethiopia for GERD’s benefits with side payments.
Countries may have a natural tendency to set aside differences when it comes to essential resources such as water. But the escalating tensions along the Nile are a sheer reminder that competitive political zones in river basins still have a higher propensity for water conflict as states take more adaptive measures to climate change, water stress, and population growth. These evolving realities will surely prompt other states with river access to bolster their water sovereignty with water infrastructure. It is imperative that international organizations monitor competitive river basins where riparians are pursuing unilateral infrastructure projects and that diplomats pursue cooperative settlements that satisfy the needs of the lower riparian states, as well as their upstream neighbors. When approached with the mutual interests of protecting water access for citizens, producing hydroelectricity, and preserving reservoirs, the water wars of the future will never have to become a reality.
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