By: Theodore Headlee
DOI:10.57912/27188568
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the end of the War in Afghanistan have understandably led the U.S. to reorient its foreign policy and security objectives away from counterterrorism to preparing for great power competition. American leaders hope they can quickly divest from regions with counterterrorism efforts, but this mindset neglects that such areas will remain relevant in an era of nation-state adversaries. West Africa is a prime example of how U.S. foreign policy must balance counterterrorism with great power competition, and how the latter will compound issues from the former. In addition to rising attacks from ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates, a string of coups in West Africa has led to the replacement of U.S. influence with Russian mercenaries. To combat the threats of terrorism and Russian influence in West Africa, the U.S. must increase engagement with the region by promoting regional ties, democratic governance, and more measured military assistance.
America’s current foreign policy in West Africa, with its prioritization of military assistance and counterterrorism, has been unable to bring stability to the region. The Global War on Terror increased scrutiny of whether West Africa could become a haven for terrorism. Concern is justified, since in areas like West Africa with long-standing ethnic tensions, extreme poverty, and shaky democracies, extremists try to promote themselves as a legitimate alternative to a difficult status quo. However, U.S. military assistance may have unintentionally worsened the social ills that fuel terrorism. Human rights abuses and reprisals committed against ethnic minorities by the U.S.-armed security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso helped exacerbate social discontent, inflame ethnic tensions, and swell the ranks of terrorist groups. The heavy emphasis on military solutions and spiraling regional violence was also in part responsible for the string of coups starting in 2020. The growing power of militaries soon overshadowed national governments struggling to address socioeconomic issues and worsening conflicts. Opportunistic military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guineaeasily abused their influence to organize coups against the still weak and increasingly unpopular democratic states they once served.
Of even greater concern, however, is how quickly Russian influence has sought to exploit the region by supporting coup leaders. The juntas of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have formed the Confederation of Sahel States (CES) to improve cooperation with each other and solidify all three’s growing ties with Russia. For its part, Russia’s most visible presence in its new West African allies remains its Wagner mercenaries, who were subsumed into the Russian Ministry of Defense’s “Africa Corps” in 2023 and have sought to assist local governments in counterinsurgency operations. In this role, the Africa Corps has largely failed. The Islamic State Sahel Province has isolated major Nigerien towns and bases while also seizing strategic roads connected to Mali and Burkina Faso. In July, dozens of Russian personnel were killed when a Malian-Africa Corps patrol was ambushed by the Al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM group and Tuareg separatists. In addition to Russia’s failure to improve the Sahel’s security, its forces have also been implicated in indiscriminate and large-scale human rights abuses against civilians. Overall, Russian mercenaries have not been a meaningful source of security in the region, though they have been a tool for autocrats to repress their populations.
Russia’s presence, however, is not exclusively centered on counterterrorism, and the military aspect is only one part of a concerted regional effort to level direct pressure on the West. Russia has also attempted to access and assume control of Western mines that produce critical minerals. Efforts to monopolize valuable metals in West Africa serve the dual purpose of both funding a sanctioned Russia and denying said resources (especially uranium) to the West as part of Russia’s long-standing campaign of “energy blackmail.” Consequently, Russia’s growing involvement in West Africa extends far beyond usurping America’s former role in a counterterrorism operation. Rather, it represents a neocolonial attempt to manipulate a region already suffering from instability by turning it into a pressure point for coercing the West.
Currently, the U.S. faces a “trilemma” in West Africa as it seeks to respond to Russian influence, address persistent extremism, and support democratic development. Previous attempts to remedy regional security issues by prioritizing military operations have failed, and the U.S. must instead rebuild its engagement with the region by carefully balancing three policies: supporting regional blocs, prioritizing economic and democratic development, and carefully conditioning military support.
Supporting regional blocs, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is the best way the U.S. can deepen ties with several countries across the region and advance the two other policies. While the democratic credentials of ECOWAS nations vary, and the bloc was weakened by the exit of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, its members are vocally opposed to the recent coups. The bloc threatened to militarily intervene after the 2023 Niger coup and has demanded that all three juntas provide a speedy return to civilian rule. Its members are also more open to Western assistance than their couped neighbors. The CES states have attempted to purge their countries of perceived Western “colonialism” by ejecting U.N., French, and U.S. troops. The ECOWAS states on West Africa’s coast remain open to the U.S. though, and they have been part of America’s efforts to establish an “outside in” strategy to combat terrorist groups further inland. Thus, ECOWAS is the closest thing to a united force that the U.S. can work with to counter extremism and Russian operations. Security, however, remains just one issue in the region, and American support for democratic and economic initiatives will be just as important in building stability and countering Russia.
A failure to address economic issues and weak governance meant that the underlying causes of extremism went unchecked in America’s former West African partners, even as empowered militaries began to become threats to democracy. To prevent repeating previous mistakes, and the possibility of more pro-Russia juntas taking control, the U.S. must strengthen the somewhat shaky democratic governments in ECOWAS. This is easier said than done, since many coastal ECOWAS members have experienced democratic backsliding. The president of Côte D'Ivoire illegally won a third term in 2020, and all Benin opposition candidates were disqualified from the 2019 National Assembly elections. Democratization is still occurring. In 2022, Benin released dozens of opposition leaders from prison, Senegal elected an opposition leader in March 2024 despite efforts by the then-president to postpone the election, and Mauritania (not an ECOWAS member) has been gradually democratizing since 2019.
The U.S. can further strengthen these democratic gains with greater economic support. The existing Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) ties funding for development projects to governance reforms, and reforming finance laws to require more generous debt relief from private creditors could promote economic growth while also heading off China and Russia’s aggressive economic influence. Together, increasing the MCC’s funding and relieving debt burdens will ultimately enable West Africa’s governments to make good on promises to improve the living conditions of their constituents and incentivize democratization.
Finally, the U.S. must be more selective in when and to whom it provides military aid. As demonstrated by Malian and Burkinabe military abuses before and after their coups, providing security assistance to partners with dubious human rights records can counterintuitively fuel insurgencies and coups. Instead, the U.S. can further legitimize its defense ties by monitoring the impact of U.S. military deployments with the help of local civil society groups and by pushing partner nations to respect human rights. The former approach will provide a better assessment of U.S. military activities in a way that listens to and addresses local grievances, and the latter will prevent abuses that drive extremist recruitment.
Despite recent expulsions, emerging Russian influence, and growing insurgencies, the U.S. cannot afford to write off West Africa or maintain its current policies. The U.S. must instead respond to the old challenge of terrorism and the new one of Russian influence by supporting regional blocs, democratization, economic development, and more careful security assistance. Even if the U.S. thinks it can deprioritize counterterrorism commitments, Russia’s efforts to use West Africa to pressure the West means that the region will remain relevant in a new era of great power competition.
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