By Caleb Rothmeyer
Imperial Japan’s legacy of violence and oppression in Korea is well documented. Yet, that does not mean peace cannot be made between the two states. In fact, reconciliation between South Korea (ROK) and Japan appears to be moving in a positive direction. There have certainly been setbacks along the way; the misunderstanding of what their 1965 normalization agreement covered, and supposedly forgave, is only one prominent example. As Japan believed the agreement laid to rest the country’s past atrocities, the ROK continued to voice anger. The distrust and resentment that was on display for the time after this confusion became apparent and has not gone away. In fact, it may be years until relations have truly normalized, as recent disputes make it evident that the human emotions surrounding the reconciliation process continue to run high.
There are several additional instances that display the hostile tensions between the ROK and Japan. In late 2018, a ROK court ordered Mitsubishi, a prominent Japanese company, to compensate Korean forced laborers, but Japan refused, fearing it would set a precedent for increased financial and moral responsibility. In 2019, Japan removed the ROK from Japan’s ‘White List”, a directory of preferential trading partners that are given special status and the privilege of importing certain items deemed critical for national security into Japan. In what was broadly seen as retaliation, the ROK did the same, terminating the General Sharing of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan. However, recent trends have shown reconciliation between the two states and a newfound solidarity to defend against shared enemies.
The ROK’s 2022 “Defense White Paper” labeled the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) an enemy, a label reserved only for when relations have been terrifyingly awful. This was the first time the state decided to make such claims since 1994, as it did so in response to a delegate from Pyongyang threatening to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” In tandem with the 2022 document’s more assertive characterization of the DPRK was an upgrade for Japan as it changed from a “neighboring country” in 2020 to a “close neighbor” in 2022. Despite the 2020 list being especially visceral by diplomatic standards when compared to the 2018 paper, the ROK announced its unwavering commitment to “continue to cooperate with Japan for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.” The ROK also reinstated the GSOMIA, signifying an important step towards security cooperation and increased diplomatic efforts.
In 2022, Japan's White Paper acknowledged numerous regional threats. Although it still referenced the Liancourt Rocks as Japanese territory, the White Paper focused more broadly on China's "attempt to change the status quo by coercion" in the East and South China Seas, as well as its "highly problematic" ties with Russia. Japan also anxiously noted the DPRK's repeated ballistic missile launches in 2022, which it characterized as a "unilateral escalation of its provocations towards the international community."
China's aggressive maritime actions in the Yellow Sea are also a constant reminder of China’s belligerent posture in the region. Japan and the ROK both feel threatened by China’s frequent incursions surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. These tensions are further compounded by incessant China cyber attacks targeting both states. The DPRK’s hostilities also litter the playing field and provide context for the warming relations between the ROK and Japan and the overcoming of their tense historical issues. Despite the disputes of 2019 and the lingering emotions, common enemies have increasingly bonded Japan and South Korea.
This shared threat perception is not the only thing pushing Japan and the ROK together; the US has been energetically promoting a closer trilateral relationship with Japan and the ROK for some time now. The benefits yielded from sustained trilateral engagement, on both the economic and security fronts, are incredibly valuable. The US has capitalized on the possibility of increased cooperation to forge stronger bonds between the two treaty allies. The United States must continue to gently nudge the two sides to a sustainable understanding but, at the same time, must be careful not to provoke backlash within domestic audiences on the peninsula from overbearing policies. Most recently, the three nations met at Camp David in an attempt to build trust between the states and assist in their mutual security cooperation. The Pentagon released a document after the meeting, which, among other things, declared the nations’ mutual support for one another, concern for security issues across the Taiwan Strait, and worry over increasing nuclear missile launches by the DPRK. The members also affirmed their intent to continue meeting in the years to come.
It is important to consider that changing administrations may have a serious, although not insurmountable, impact on the ROK’s foreign policy. Elections are scheduled for 2024, and an administration similar to Moon’s may cause tensions to flare again. Moon Jae-in was widely seen as pugilistic toward Japan and showed little concern for bringing up issues thought to be put to bed. This is in contrast to his more pragmatic successor, Yoon Suk Yeol. An administration like the Yoon government would be better for the reconciliation process. But even under a more pugnacious administration, it appears likely that both sides will recognize the need for facilitating cooperation as opposed to furthering conflict.
Both the US promotion of a strong trilateral relationship and the threat of North Korean and Chinese aggression have pulled Japan and the ROK together and caused them to–at least temporarily– push aside their historical grievances. Despite the scare in 2019, both countries’ White List status has been restored, and the GSOMIA is no longer under threat. The issues surrounding reconciliation are still emotional, but the current threat environment demands cooperation.
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