By Alexander Wall
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013 as a centerpiece of Chinese economic influence in developing nations. The U.S.’s understanding of the BRI is that the initiative is less about making economic gains for China, but instead for growing its geopolitical influence. Despite the apparent failures of these projects from an economic perspective, it is true that from a strategic perspective, BRI has quickly become a way for China to exert influence on developing nations to further China’s interests. It has been observed that China uses BRI to sway global opinion on its “red line” issues which, in China’s view, should be handled by China alone. These issues include a wide variety of human rights issues such as the detainment and monitoring of the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, the repression of Tibetans, Mongols, as well as other issues China encounters as it relates to the One China policy. Perhaps the most important issue for China and the One China policy, since the founding of the PRC in 1949, is the status of Taiwan, which is the poster child for Chinese red-line issues. The BRI poses a large problem for many Western observers of China; the U.S. needs to find a way to counter Chinese influence across the developing world without starting its own version of the BRI, which would be riddled with problems from the onset.
China uses a combination of what has come to be known as aid for votes and checkbook diplomacy to sway international opinion in its favor. The idea of aid for votes, is China essentially bribing nations to take China’s side on issues it deems important. This often comes in the form of infrastructure projects. BRI brings these issues to the forefront because, it becomes expected that those who receive Chinese aid are tacitly expected to use their votes to shield China from condemnation over its embarrassing human rights record such as Tibet and Xinjiang, among other issues.
A secondary reason is to thwart Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to table motions on its behalf. Chinese loans often come with very few domestic political strings attached, since China does not have much of a stake in whether a recipient is practicing good governance, and China’s only concern is gaining more support to suppress backlash for its many human rights violations. These plans have so far shown success for China in its efforts to sway international opinion. As seen in the EU, China’s economic presence created a situation where Greece opted to abstain from a 2017 EU statement denouncing China’s human rights record. China will continue to use this aid as a proverbial shield to protect itself from criticisms levied against it for its poor record on human rights or issues respecting sovereignty. China frames all these issues as domestic affairs and the corresponding UN principle of non-intervention when receiving criticisms of these issues. China uses the BRI as a means to strengthen its own support enabling it to protect itself from criticisms over its human rights violations and other red line issues.
The second tactic highlighted is the use of “checkbook diplomacy” in its ongoing dispute with Taiwan over the One China policy. This policy is a Chinese-created idea that Taiwan is a renegade province of China, and any cross-strait tensions are an internal matter. One such example is how China handles the few remaining nations that diplomatically recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC. Most of these countries are in the South Pacific or Central America. Chinese efforts to influence them to abandon ties with Taiwan have already been successful; in one such example, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua changed their official positions on Taiwan after being provided loans and infrastructure investments from China. While neither of these nations have officially signed on to the BRI, it stands to reason that these countries will soon, as China looks to solidify its relationship. It can be assumed that these incentives came with the implicit promise that these countries abandon their ties to Taiwan and in return become open markets for Chinese goods. In addition to these measures,
China refuses to have any substantial relations with countries that recognize Taiwan which locks these countries out of the goods China can provide. China can use its economic powers to sway nations into accepting China’s view of Taiwan as a win for both parties. It is a win for China because Taiwan loses one more supporter in the international institutions which could advocate on Taiwan’s behalf, and the recipient gains aid or infrastructure to grow their economy as well as an opening to more Chinese goods. China did have favorable relations with Nicaragua before it switched allegiances, however, these favorable trade conditions were seen as a precursor to the switching of allegiances, and this is China’s expected outcome. China wields its BRI funding as a weapon against smaller nations with little to no recourse and often have no choice but to accept this tacit agreement.
These attempts at what could be considered bribery do not end in Central America. The South Pacific has become a new battleground between China and Taiwan. China and Taiwan take advantage of the economic vulnerability of small island nations in need of economic support, which China leverages to align these nations to the One China Policy. This dispute has been going on for years and Taiwan is placed in an increasingly precarious situation as more and more of its allies are pulled into China’s orbit with the promise of economic prosperity and aid for their small economies. This causes a strain on the South Pacific which is, “reportedly littered with incongruous Chinese white elephants, the preferred conduit of aid-for-favors”. It stands to reason that these so-called white elephants, which are usually favorable investments for the islands, are an important part of China’s foreign policy as they look to undermine any support for Taiwan, not through force and coercion but through its economic powers and the benefits it can provide. China will continue to deploy a range of tactics to influence countries to switch their allegiances to Taiwan, but most of them involve China’s considerable economic strength that Taiwan cannot afford to replicate.
Taking all of this into account, what is the U.S. to do? Well, there are no easy answers, for starters creating a U.S. version of BRI would be riddled with problems, chief among them is that China has no expectations placed for good governance and respect for human rights with recipient nations, the U.S. cannot replicate that due to domestic political backlash from human rights groups and activists. One possible solution would be to make countries choose America or China, but this also neglects the desperate situation many states are in when they accept these loans, not to mention their already high dependence on China. There is one thing the U.S. can do, which is keep the pressure on China for its human rights record, especially with nations who share a similar religious identity to the Uyghurs being kept in prisons in Xinjiang. The U.S. has one more recent development in its favor; the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 has galvanized support for Ukraine, especially among some African nations where some see Russia as an aggressor violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. Taking that argument to a logical conclusion will suggest that these nations should also oppose a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. should use these two factors in its support to undermine the alleged cooperative program that BRI sells to nations desperate for economic stability.
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