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Daniel Guzman

A Threat Next Door: How Cuba Remains Dangerous for United States Security

By Daniel Guzman

DOI: 10.57912/25639518

 

In June 2023, a sudden development rang alarm bells for U.S. national security. An intelligence report stated that a multi-billion dollar agreement had been reached to establish a Chinese spy base on Cuban soil, posing an undoubtable security threat to the United States. While an openly hostile decision, it was not an original one considering the Soviet Union had done the same at the height of the Cold War. However, the news grew more alarming as it was revealed that the spy base had already been operating since at least 2019. Not only that, a second report revealed that negotiations over a new military facility were underway with the potential to permanently host an array of Chinese soldiers. If constructed, Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops could be stationed less than 100 miles from the continental United States and present a continual danger to the American homeland. Once again, the safety of the United States has been put at risk due to policies and actions pursued by the communist leadership in Cuba. This recent development is only one of many examples of how the Cuban regime, which has ruled since the 1959 revolution, has continuously chosen to be a U.S. adversary and subvert U.S. regional interests. Cuba remains a threat to the United States, as it has historically tried to undermine U.S.-Latin America relations through malignant concentrated efforts and persistently continues to do so today. The U.S. must continue to target the regime with sanctions and refuse to reward the Cuban government unless the state changes its behavior.

While an ample threat to the United States, modern-day Cuba only holds a fraction of its former power. It was most powerful during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which resulted in the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles onto the Caribbean island a mere arm’s length from American soil. Threats between the U.S. and USSR were made, a naval blockade on Cuba was enacted, negotiations were held, cooler heads prevailed, and a deal was struck for missile removal. While the Cold War-era embargo on Cuba remains today, many have come to believe that it is time to lift the sanctions and start a new chapter in U.S.-Cuba relations that “forgives and forgets” past animosities. Known as the Cuban Thaw, President Obama spearheaded these attempts by reopening the U.S. embassy in Havana, removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and loosening restrictions on remittances. This thaw soon refroze under President Trump, who reinstated Cuba onto the aforementioned list while reestablishing new sanctions and restrictions—an action likely encouraged by the mysterious Havana Syndrome incident. Currently, President Biden is engaging in rapprochement efforts akin to Obama’s and has eased restrictions on family remittances and travel to the island.  His efforts face resistance as he tries to balance U.S.-Cuba policy between his own strategy and calls from the opposition to tighten restrictions, especially after Cuba’s crackdown on democratic protests in 2021.


While many misinterpret the embargo as a relic of the Cold War, it should instead be recognized as an appropriate response to the relentless human rights abuses, undemocratic practices, and overall oppression committed by the Cuban government onto its citizens. To preserve the authoritarian regime and its policies, it seeks to meddle in the domestic politics of other Latin American nations in order to maximize support for pro-Cuba ideologies and anti-U.S. sentiment. By aiding in the proliferation of these beliefs, it can increase tangible foreign support for Cuba while in turn degrading this type of support for the United States. The U.S. benefits from living in a neighborhood of allies, but Cuba benefits from living among one of the enablers and, thus, uses the mechanisms of influence it possesses to aid and prolong anti-American governments across the continent. The U.S. must recognize the danger of Cuba’s efforts because the fewer allies the U.S. has in Latin America, the more it will find itself allocating finite resources toward responding to threats south of the border.


Cuban doctrine requires that Cuba directly and indirectly interfere on behalf of communist and anti-American movements throughout the region. Its malicious track record, ranging from providing these movements with training and supplies to facilitating the use of Cuban resources, has enabled radical political minorities to have outsized influence throughout Latin America. A few historical examples include Nicaragua, where the communist Sandinista government received Cuban advisors for weapons training, and Colombia, where guerilla groups such as the FARC have received supplies and access to Cuban services. The most outright example today is Cuban interference in Venezuela on behalf of the Maduro regime. Cuba has been accused by the United States, the Organization of American States, and various non-governmental organizations of having an active presence throughout the Venezuelan government, military, and intelligence services. Thanks to Cuba, the Venezuelan regime maintains a firm grip on power and decision-making while the Venezuelan military has mastered the ability to suppress dissent and prevent popular democratic uprisings. 


Cuban interference is a persistent source of many security issues facing America. It enabled the survival of the Ortega regime in Nicaragua, which has become a transit hub for migrants, and the Maduro regime in Venezuela, which has weaponized its migration crisis to pressure U.S. foreign policy. On the political front, Cuba finds allies in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil, all of which are regional powerhouses hosting U.S.-skeptic leaders. By supporting and legitimizing anti-American sentiment regionally, it sets up another clear threat: Chinese and Russian intrusion into the Latin American sphere. While relations with Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are cause for concern, the most critical is its cooperation with our major geo-political rivals China and Russia. Chinese and Russian doctrine revolves around challenging global American hegemony; this means increasing their presence throughout Latin America to seek economic, diplomatic, and military dominance. The Cuban island is a friendly bastion from which Russia and China can threaten the U.S. or influence regional nations.


China has surpassed the United States as the largest trade partner for much of Latin America and China’s Belt and Road Initiative efforts have established a Chinese presence at roughly 40 ports and 11 ground satellite stations. Since Chinese corporations are subservient to the CCP, there is a risk that Beijing may use these corporations to advance its interests abroad. Chinese-controlled ports and satellite bases outside of the PRC can double as military assets and be used as forward operating bases. To a lesser extent is Russia’s cooperation with regional authoritarian regimes specializing in military and security-related fields. Russia has landed nuclear-capable bombers on airfields in Venezuela and Nicaragua, provided arms and security equipment to security forces in Nicaragua and Cuba, and sent its Wagner mercenaries to Venezuela. In Cuba, alongside spy and military bases, China has secured or completed contracts for infrastructure projects involving telecommunications providers and a port in Santiago, both of which are vulnerable to CCP interference. Whenever U.S.-Russia relations become unfavorable, Russia suggests increasing military cooperation with Cuba and the possible return of nuclear missiles. On the international stage, Cuba consistently votes in line with both nations to reciprocate each other’s faux legitimacy. Its willingness to be a pawn in the grand strategy game against China and Russia makes Cuba an American problem.


In its current form, Cuba is neither free nor fair, and its institutions act as fervent extensions of the Communist Party of Cuba. The United States must stand firmly against the Cuban regime and strengthen sanctions while resisting ever-growing calls for an end to the embargo. Any reduction in sanctioning must come with strict conditionals, thus an active sanctions-based coercive diplomacy approach to the “carrot and stick” method must be conducted to prevent Cuban society from becoming complacent with the regime’s oppression. This means allowing Cuba to taste the economic benefits it could accrue from democratization through tactical periodic sanctions relief (the carrot), immediately followed by swift reestablishment of sanctions (the stick) to pressure decision-makers to seek domestic policy changes. After ensuring that the Departments of State and Treasury have the political will, greater funding should be allocated so both can increase targeted sanctions against persons and entities connected with the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services. In order to enjoy the economic benefits that come from access to the U.S. trade market, Cuba must first conduct the necessary reforms for a more just government, not the other way around. It comes down to a simple question: if the Cuban government hasn't changed its ways over the past 60 years, why should they be rewarded with access to our spending, investments, and markets?

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