By Narupat Rattanakit
Last year, the Biden administration introduced the Indo-Pacific Strategy and National Defense Strategy, marking a significant milestone as they reached their one-year mark. With the persistent fears of how the Trump Administration postured a lukewarm approach to alliance building, many have raised concerns about the Biden Administration’s strategies. However, it becomes evident that the Biden administration has made noteworthy steady progress in reshaping the United States security architecture with these two pivotal documents. This progress is particularly noteworthy in the emerging landscape of the Indo-Pacific region.
Tension remains ever so hostile between China and the United States. The security dynamics in the era of the Indo-Pacific have seen drastic developments since the US rebalance to Asia and China's growing geopolitical assertiveness. These developments have created rifts in the region and concerted efforts for like-minded allies and partners in Asia to strengthen their respective deterrent capabilities, particularly within the maritime security domain.
The complex patchwork of East Asia's regional security under the bulwark of the US hubs and spokes (San Francisco System), a network of alliances the US pursued in the Asia-Pacific region, after the end of World War II. This history of bilateral security has positioned the US at the forefront of security alliances in Asia and established the nation as a fixed part of Asia's postwar security landscape. Given the emergence and relevance of the Indo-Pacific region, the security structure needs to correspond accordingly to the emerging conception.
The work-in-progress latticework, first mentioned in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and again in March 2023 by Assistant Secretary Daniel J. Kritenbrink, is an approach with a strong emphasis on being “inclusive, free, and open.” This allows US allies and their partners the opportunity to take initiative on their priorities to contribute with a more specialized role to diversify the division of labor within the alliance and partnership. This approach thus is interconnected, rather than woven from one patchwork to the other.
The US trilateral coalitions in the Indo-Pacific, along with Japan's bilateral cooperation in the subregion of Southeast Asia, has demonstrated the relevance of the QUAD, a minilateral grouping that comprises the United States, Japan, India, and Australia and a key component of US Indo-Pacific strategy. While scholarship regarding minilateralism is in its nascent phase, it constitutes a type of collaboration, whether ad hoc or institutionalized, involving approximately four to six countries united for a shared security objective or objectives. The grouping promotes a rules-based order, protecting freedom of navigation, and promoting democratic values. Its inception traces back to 2004, an informal grouping known as the Tsunami Core Group designated to quickly respond to crises, provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India. Aside from the QUAD, AUKUS is another minilateral grouping that has also been salient.
Japan's ongoing efforts to enhance bilateral cooperation in the region with Thailand, Vietnam, and most recently with the Philippines, coupled with the United States' forming trilateral coalitions, have solidified the position of the two QUAD members. This collaborative approach has effectively softened the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states' skepticism toward the QUAD, particularly the Philippines, with its perception of the latter being more than solely a military security grouping.
Additionally, Japan's host of the Naval Exercise Malabar last year, which included a variety of high-end tactical training of both sea and air operations, has accompanied and exhibited what ASEAN member states could gain leverage from based on its ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). This serves as a symbolic manifestation of the group's aspirations rather than a concrete pathway to achieve specific outcomes (e.g. maritime cooperation or climate change and disaster risk reduction and management).
Another reason for this softening skepticism of the group was the QUAD Leader’s Summit meeting held in Hiroshima in May. It reaffirmed the grouping's consistent and unwavering support for ASEAN centrality, ASEAN-led architecture, and ASEAN’s AIOP. This shows cooperation among close allies and a common desire to push forward a constructive substitute for a regional system led by China. Japan continues to be an important ally for the US; it is an honest broker that has strong ties to the US. Furthermore, Tokyo’s ability to work closely with countries in Southeast Asia has given the leverage the US needs to rework its Indo-Pacific security architecture.
Aside from the growing significance of the QUAD, progress has already occurred to meet the demands of overhauling the security structure through minilateralism or informal networks. US-led trilateral coalitions, such as US-Japan-India, the recent institutionalization of the US-Japan-South Korea, and a work-in-progress US-Japan-Philippines, have demonstrated concerted efforts to achieve integrated deterrence, emphasized by the National Defense Strategy.
Despite the steady progress in the Indo-Pacific under the Biden administration, a counterargument to this is that US regional partners are also concerned about the overemphasis of US deterrence over the long-term where US deterrence will dominate security issues in the region. Such reliance goes at the expense of diplomacy and engagement with China. Furthermore, the reworking of the security structure is fundamental to deter China’s assertive posture. For countries in the region, particularly in the subregion of Southeast Asia, it ultimately creates a situation where they are forced to choose one over the other, ultimately pushing them towards stronger dependence on minilateralism.
However, there is a shared responsibility involved that enables its allies and partners to actively maneuver between the two rivals. As middle powers continue to hedge, most recently with Vietnam granting the US rank as a Comprehensive Strategic Partner, it also bears the responsibility to manage their relations with China. Such responsibility applies the same to the US where its commitment to deterrence must be gradual while also being aware of China’s importance to its allies and partners, and the utility of multilateralism to help mitigate those distresses.
More consequently, the US must also be mindful of existing ASEAN-led regional architectures, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), to be utilized in managing the US security architecture through its latticework approach. Recently, however, President Biden’s recent absence from attending the EAS in September was marked by “disappointment” in which his “absence was felt throughout,” and a “missed opportunity to cement gains.” Instead, Biden went to Vietnam. This type of behavior, similarly done by Trump of choosing bilateral over multilateral visits, will cost the US its commitment to ASEAN, which many analysts in the sub region remain skeptical about.
In conclusion, for the US security architecture to maintain its progress, ensuring a consistent deterrent against China's growing assertive behavior in the Indo-Pacific region must be weighed by its allies and partners to gauge and synchronize China’s assertiveness. As Washington continues its strategy for inclusive deterrence through the latticework and minilateral approaches, it should not further complicate Southeast Asian countries' efforts to balance their relations with China. While a US-NATO presence may not be possible in the region, a more challenging task is the need to strike a balance between creating a formal arrangement and making multilateral activities a credible deterrent that is not regionally dominated by the US. Lastly, utilizing ASEAN-led regional architectures is crucial for the US to strengthen a resilient and connected presence in the evolving security landscape of the Indo-Pacific.
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