By Ryan Curtis
Turkey is a wildcard ally in one of the most strategically important regions of the world. Always on the fringe in the NATO alliance, Turkey was a closer partner to the U.S. during the Cold War. Since the Soviet collapse and the election of President and right-wing leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2014, Turkey has established itself as a regional power in its own right. The US-Turkish relationship is highly complex and has at times been strained, but the alliance is essential to the future of U.S. policy in the region.
Turkey’s geographic position alone makes it a critical U.S. partner. The state sits at a crossroads between Asia, Europe, Russia, and the Mediterranean. 48,000 vessels pass through the Turkish Straits each year, many of which are transporting critical oil and natural gas resources to Europe. Turkey is a measurably powerful country: boasting a GDP of $1.3 trillion, and a population of 85 million, Turkey has the largest GDP and second largest population out of all countries in the Middle East. Turkey is the second largest military in NATO, and a critical regional power. The Turkish Armed Forces are deployed to combat zones in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, and Turkish diplomatic influence extends into Qatar, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and other countries in the region. Turkey has a network of partners and proxies in the Middle East, and they have shown a desire to be the regional power in the area. They are powerful and able to project that power; sometimes in support of the US’ interests, while other times in opposition to them. It is better for the U.S. that Turkey remains proximate to the Euro-Atlantic sphere and legally positioned against NATO’s enemies, rather than casting Turkey out and leaving them to work closer with Russia, China, and Iran.
Currently, there are both foreign and domestic issues that make the alliance tense. Foreign policy wise, Turkey sees itself as a middleman between the Euro-Atlantic world and Russia. This has manifested most acutely in the S-400 system scandal, where Turkey engaged in a $2.5 billion purchase of a Russian air defense system, violating the NATO standard of weapons integration. This purchase resulted in Turkey being removed from the F-35 program, costing both U.S. and Turkish firms hundreds of millions in lost revenue. Turkey has also continued to purchase large quantities of Russian oil and never sanctioned Russia significantly after the start of the Ukraine War. But, Turkey is not a Russian ally though; they played an essential role in the drafting of the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative and will play a vital role in any future Ukrainian peace agreements. Turkey also has provided Ukraine weapons to aid in their defense against Russia–most notably the potent Bayraktar TB2 drones. Additionally, U.S. pressure has been shown to shape Turkish policy: a major Turkish oil terminal recently terminated all Russian imports in the face of American sanctions, and NATO membership for Sweden and Finland was finally approved by Turkey in exchange for F-16 sales. Turkey may be a middling and unreliable ally, but it has proven its willingness to cooperate with the U.S. if the circumstances are dire or the rewards are sufficient.
Domestically, Turkey has a democracy problem. A long history of military coups has made Turkey's commitment to democracy a little shaky, and Erdogan’s rise to power has only made the situation worse. Erdogan’s regime has been a classic case of democratic backsliding: freedom of the press has been restricted, power has transferred to the presidency instead of the parliament, and xenophobic and discriminatory policies target Kurdish and Syrian minorities in the country. The EU accession process once was the priority of the Turkish government but has been largely abandoned by Erdogan, mostly for nationalistic reasons. US-Turkey relations have been especially shaky since the 2016 Coup attempt in Turkey, an event which left the government highly paranoid and led to the arrests of over 77,000 domestic opponents for alleged links to the Coup. The Turkish government formally blames Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen for the Coup, who currently resides within the US. The U.S. has refused to extradite him to Turkey, which has led to further tension between the two nations. Turkey was once a liberal democracy, but it is no longer that. While not a pure autocracy, the authoritarian, nationalist, Islamist, and dictatorial nature of the current Turkish government cannot be papered over, but it should not spell the end of the alliance.
The US-Turkey alliance has always been somewhat transactional. This is not going away anytime soon, at least not while Erdogan’s hold on the country continues. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to restock and reinforce democracy in Turkey, but that cannot be forced. It can however be encouraged by further cooperation with the EU, or by incentives from the US. The Euro-Atlantic world and Turkey share interests in many fields, and should cooperate on what they can, so that they are capable of taking Turkey fully back into the Euro-Atlantic fold when Erdogan eventually leaves office.
There is much fear about Turkey positioning itself as an intermediary, but at the end of the day, Turkey is aligned towards the Euro-Atlantic community. They are a member of NATO, a potential EU member, and a historical enemy of Russia. The future of great power conflict in the world may shake up Turkey’s stance on individual issues, but currently Turkey is geographically and politically drawn to prefer America over Russia or China. Past U.S. action has shown that Turkish cooperation can be earned through transactions or forced through sanctions. Perfection in internal structure and foreign policy cannot be expected of Turkey, nor should it be forced upon them. But, as long as the U.S. maintains some hand in Turkey’s future, Turkey will lean towards the Euro-Atlantic world, and that seems to be the best possible outcome for the US.
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